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Purpose Statement

| This publication is by and largely for the academic communities of the
twenty-eight colleges and universities of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America. It is published by the Vocation and
Education unit of the ELCA. The publication has its home at Augustana College, Rock Island, Illinois, which has generously offered leadership and physical and financial support as an institutional sponsor for the publication.
The ELCA has frequently sponsored conferences for faculty and administrators that have addressed the church-college/
university partnership. The ELCA has sponsored an annual Vocation of the Lutheran College Conference. The primary
purpose of Intersections is to enhance and continue such dialogue. It will do so by:
• Lifting up the vocation of Lutheran colleges and universities
• Encouraging thoughtful dialogue about the partnership of colleges and universities with the church
• Offering a forum for concerns and interests of faculty at the intersection of faith, learning, and teaching
• Raising for debate issues about institutional missions, goals, objectives, and learning priorities
• Encouraging critical and productive discussion on our campuses of issues focal to the life of the church
• Serving as a bulletin board for communications among institutions and faculties
• Publishing papers presented at conferences sponsored by the ELCA and its institutions
• Raising the level of awareness among faculty about the Lutheran heritage and connectedness of their institutions,

realizing a sense of being part of a larger family with common interests and concerns.

From the Publisher | I am really looking forward to holding this issue of Intersections in my

hands. The Evangelical Lutheran Church in America (ELCA) as a church body is still a teenager; it was established in
1987-88. The journal Intersections is even younger. It has been published by the ELCA Division for Higher Education and
Schools (DHES) since 1996, so it is only ten years old. But both the church body and the journal have gone through major
changes this year.
The ELCA has gone through restructuring. The DHES no longer exists. The work for the church and the colleges and
universities that are related to the ELCA continues almost as before, but it is now done within the Educational Partnerships
and Institutions (EPI) group within the unit for Vocation and Education (VE). So even though those who work with the
colleges and universities do the same work as before, we have new colleagues, new bosses, a new set of budget codes, and as
you can see above, a whole new set of acronyms. Soon we will also have new offices on a different floor of the Chicago building where the churchwide offices are located.
Intersections has a new editor, Robert Haak, is located at a new college, uses a new printing firm, and has a new design
and layout. This issue is devoted to one of the most important issues that the ELCA is dealing with right now, human sexuality. Many of us hate to talk about and read about sexuality, because it used to be a taboo topic, and because so many people
have such strong opinions about it that no matter what we say or do we may offend. But a church that serves the needs of its
members and the needs of this society must deal with it, and so I am glad that the ELCA is developing a social statement on
sexuality, just as it is developing a social statement on education.
The first draft of Our Calling in Education: A First Draft of a Social Statement (2006) has now been distributed
for discussion and comments. A copy may be requested from 1-800-638-3522, extension 2966, or downloaded from
www.elca.org/socialstatements/education. The Task Force on Education would like to receive your comments no later
than October 15, 2006, so they can consider them as they prepare the next draft for discussion and action at the ELCA
Churchwide Assembly in 2007.
Living in God’s Amazing Grace,
Arne Selbyg | Director for Colleges and Universities
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From the Editor | ROBERT D. HAAK
Tom Christenson began his introduction to the last
issue by asking what adjective should be used to describe that
issue. That also seems like an appropriate question to begin
my introduction to this Spring 2006 issue. Some of you who
pay particular attention to the arrival of Intersections in your
mailbox will answer that the most fitting adjective will be
“late.” There is truth in this description. As is often the case,
when I inherited the editing duties for this journal from Tom
Christenson, I misjudged the complexity of the task (and maybe
also my own resources!). I hope that those of you who have been
patiently waiting will find that the result was worth the wait.
My own preferred adjective would be “new” (we will have to wait
to decide whether “and improved” should be added to the phrase).
The journal has a new look and feel. We hope that the changes will
enhance its readability and “eye appeal.” We are coming to you from
a new place—Augustana College in Rock Island, Illinois. I would
like to thank Augustana for its commitment to and support of this
project. I hope that you will find some of the ideas in this issue new
as well.
As is announced on the cover page, the theme of this issue is
“Lutherans and Human Sexuality.” I have to admit that growing
up it never would have occurred to me that these two concepts
belonged together. I imagine there are some readers out there
who still feel this way. But, as Lutherans, it seems that we ought
to have something valuable to say about such an important
topic. The need to continue (or begin?) discussions was made
clear by the controversies swirling around the votes taken at the
Churchwide Assembly in Orlando last summer. While it is clear
that some members of the ELCA hope the Orlando resolutions
will be the last words on such topics, the continuing work of the
Task Force for ELCA Studies on Sexuality and the report they
will issue mean that the conversations are just beginning. This is
especially true as we begin to talk about the much broader issues
of human sexuality.
The question that I asked in putting together this issue was
“what might ELCA colleges be able to contribute to the conver4 | Intersections | Spring 2006

sations about human sexuality?” Each of the articles in this issue
gives a part of an answer to this question. Yeager calls on the colleges to educate in a way that will create the sort of community
that can have these sorts of conversations and still remain a community. Colleges might well be models of this discourse. Benne
ends with a similar thought but doubts that Lutheran colleges
will be able to be the sort of place where this will happen. He
concludes with a challenge to the colleges and universities to
gather and to put into action the sort of conversations that they
claim are at the heart of their identity.
In between these two calls for conversation we find the conversation modeled by Williams and Bussie. Williams proposes a
model for how Lutherans might use the biblical text to inform
the conversations that take place. She terms this a “critical
traditionalist hermeneutic.” Bussie proposes that the Lutheran
confessions and Lutheran theology also can provide resources
for this conversation.
While much of the conversation to this point has centered
on the understanding of same sex relationships, Nack reminds
us that the range of questions dealing with sexuality (Lutheran
and non-Lutheran) is much broader than this question. Pastors
and parishioners and college faculty and others are all faced
with a wide range of ethical and social issues surrounding the
understanding of human sexuality. One of the questions that
I asked when beginning to think about these issues was what
the data told us about the sexual activities and understandings
of Lutheran college students today. My experience as a college
teacher over the last twenty years seemed to indicate to me
that sexuality was an issue that was fairly high on the list of
“interesting topics” for my students. When checking into what
we know about “sex and the Lutheran college student,” I was a
bit shocked to find out that we really don’t know much about
the topic. Our college students are surveyed on a wide range of
subjects, but (maybe not too surprisingly) their sexual attitudes
have not been an area of exploration. It may be that collecting
some relevant data to inform the discussion is something that

the Lutheran colleges and universities could well contribute to
the conversation.
In order to begin to fill the void, I asked the folks who conducted the National Study of Youth and Religion (http://www.
youthandreligion.org) if they had data specifically on sexuality
and Lutheran students. The answer came back that no one had
ever asked the question before. That in itself is an interesting
fact. I asked them to determine if there was enough data in
their set to be able to say anything significant specifically about
Lutheran youth. They found the following facts in their survey.1
•	Nearly 43% of Lutheran teens do not necessarily believe

that people should wait for marriage to have sex. (About
the same percentage as for the total sample of teens
sampled.)
• 68% of the ELCA teens would consider living with a

partner to whom they were not married.
•	Nearly 24% of Lutheran teens have engaged in oral sex.

(Slightly higher than the total sample. Over 8% of the
Lutherans had engaged in oral sex before age 15.)
• Over 16% of Lutheran teens have had sexual intercourse.
• Almost 80% of the Lutheran teens who had intercourse

used protection.
• Over 90% of those Lutheran teens who had intercourse

were not under the influence of alcohol or drugs during
their first experience.

I would like to thank Arne Selbyg, Director for Colleges and
Universities and the Vocation and Education program unit for
the chance to make a contribution to the ongoing conversations
about the nature of Lutheran colleges. I would also like to thank
Tom Christenson for all the assistance he has given in making
the transition to this “new” journal a smooth one. I would ask
each of you who read and value Intersections to consider submitting your thoughts for perusal by your colleagues. Please send
any submissions (preferably in electronic MLA format) to me
at avrbh@augustana.edu. I look forward to the continuation of
this work!
Robert D. Haak | The Augustana Center for Vocational
Reflection, Augustana College, Rock Island, Illinois

Endnotes
1. These results were reported to me on 4/5/2006 based on the
analysis of Kyle Longest who works for the National Study of Youth
and Religion. “Lutheran teens” for the purposes of this study are
defined as teens whose parents identified themselves as Lutheran. They
are not necessarily teens who attend Lutheran colleges and universities.
The total number of “Lutheran teens” was 135. The number of “ELCA
Lutheran teens” was 50. This is a relatively small number within the
total survey. While it might be hoped that a larger sample could be
examined, this is the best that I could find at this point. Have any
of the faculty at any of our colleges asked these sorts of questions of
their students?

• More than 18% of Lutheran teens never attend church.
• More than 57% of Lutheran teens attend church more

than a few times a year.
• Of this last group, 25% of the ELCA teens report that the

church has done nothing to help them with their sexuality.
This might be the beginning of a conversation that seems to
be very important to Lutheran teens—and probably to all of us.
If 25% of these teens feel that the church has nothing helpful to
say to them in this conversation, it seems that there is considerable room for improvement. Many questions remain. Would a
larger data base result in significantly different results? What
other questions could we ask with a larger sample? What are the
important questions that need to be asked?
With Yeager and Benne, I would like to see what ELCA
colleges and universities could add to the conversation about
important issues facing the church and our communities. These
conversations are also important for our own understanding of
our role as “Lutheran colleges,” not colleges isolated from the
communities in which they exist.
5

D. M. YEager

A Church, the Human Condition,
and the Fissured Face of Peace1
But now in Christ Jesus you who once were far off have been brought near by the blood of Christ. For
he is our peace; in his flesh he has made both groups into one and has broken down the dividing wall,
that is, the hostility between us.

—Ephesians 2:13, 14

To fulfill these purposes, this church shall: . . . Study social issues and trends, work to discover
the causes of oppression and injustice, and develop programs of ministry and advocacy to further
human dignity, freedom, justice, and peace in all the world.

—ELCA Constitution, sec. 4.03.1

In January 2005, after nearly three years of work, the Task
Force for ELCA Studies on Sexuality released its report and its
three recommendations concerning the church’s policies relating to same-sex couples. From this report, the Church Council
developed three resolutions, which were made public in April;
two of these matched the recommendations of the task force,
but the third differed. In August the Churchwide Assembly
acted on these resolutions and the multiple amendments and
substitute motions that were proposed from the floor. The first
two resolutions were affirmed by the Assembly (the second with
an amendment of wording, the effect of which was variously
interpreted); the third was defeated, as were all of the substitute
motions advanced by voting members. These dry facts give no
hint of the turmoil, at the level of both intellectual exchange
and practical maneuvering, that has characterized the ELCA
since the 2001 Churchwide Assembly placed these disputes

near the top of the agenda of our church. As a member of that
task force, I have been invited to reflect on what “lessons for
the church’s educational mission” might be derived from this
experience. Perhaps counterintuitively, I would like to focus on
what might be learned about peace.
If furthering “peace in all the world” is part of the mission
of the church, then it is also the mission of Lutheran colleges
and universities. We all, I suspect, carry around in our minds
some very sentimental and romanticized notions of peace,
notions that make it difficult to imagine that the controversy,
anger, and alienation swirling around Lutheran teachings and
policies relating to same-sex couples could be at all relevant to a
ministry of peace, except as exemplifying its absence. Yet if we
equate peace with the absence of disagreement, then truly there
could be no peace, and all efforts to promote it would be futile.
I would like to propose that we try, inspired by this passage

D. M. YEAGER is Associate Professor of Theology at Georgetown University and a member of the Task Force for ELCA Studies on Sexuality.
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from Ephesians, to equate peace, instead, with the absence of
hostility and violence (and that we construe “violence” broadly
as coercive force). Margaret Payne and James Childs quoted this
scriptural text at the end of the letter with which they submitted
the task force recommendations to the Church Council. Above
their signatures, the letter closed, “In Christ’s peace.”
My theme, then, is “the fissured face of peace”—and by this
I mean to invoke a rock face that is cleft, cracked, and broken. I
dislike postmodern jargon, but “fissured” is one of the terms that
I have found very helpful. “Fissures” point to contradictions,
silences, disconnects, discontinuities, conflicts, and disagreements; but the important thing about fissures is that they do not
go all the way through whatever medium (face) they disrupt.
When the task force was created, many expected—or at least
hoped—that it would, by diligent and careful study, listening, and reasoning, produce peace in the church by supplying
final and definitive answers to the questions at the heart of the
controversy. The church longed for the restoration of tranquility
and appointed a task force to achieve that. Not surprisingly, in
the months after the task force report became public, considerable disappointment and criticism were voiced because the task
force had not “settled the question.” In the first part of this
article, I will review why the task force did not do what many
had expected. The factors that account for the course the task
force pursued involve us in reflection on the nature of moral
controversies, the inevitability of change, and the ways in which
communities undertake to deal with controversies, dissent, and
challenges to received tradition and authority. While we may
wish to think about all of these things in ways that draw upon
the Christian and Lutheran understanding of our situation
before God and before one another, we cannot think about
them in isolation from a well-grounded understanding of the
human condition, or the realities of (fallen) creation. To be
careless on this point in our pursuit of peace is to end up chasing
after some invention of our dreams. In the second section, then,
I will draw upon Hannah Arendt’s incisive description of the
human condition to highlight some of these indelible features of
our creaturely being, and in the last section I will suggest some
ways in which a deep and reverent understanding of the human
condition might be accented in our colleges and universities,
with the hope of enabling our graduates to disagree without
hostility, to evaluate without hatred or condescension, to engage
change in positive and constructive ways, and to embrace in
hope and courage the difficult work of making our views more
true, our judgments more reliable, and our institutions more
humane and just.

Reasons for not “settling the question”
It is probably fair to say that the report pleased no one. Those
who were not particularly invested in these questions either way
were discouraged and disappointed to find that no final word had
been spoken to end what has developed into a bitter controversy.
They had been hopeful that there would be a definitive resolution
one way or another that would, as they often put it, allow the
church to “move on” and redirect its energy and passion toward
other urgent concerns such as economic justice, the deteriorating situations in the Middle East and the Sudan, the health-care
challenges we face in the United States, hunger and homelessness
in our own country and in the world, and ecological degradation.
The task force had been appointed to produce clarity and end a
squabble, and since, as a practical matter, we did not do that, they
judged that we had failed to fulfill the charge we were given.
Others saw the failure as a moral and theological one. To
them, the report had the look of moral spinelessness—and it
looked that way both to those who had hoped that the task
force would affirm the existing policies and support their
enforcement, and to those who had hoped that the task force
would recommend revising those policies in the name of justice.
In a list-serve e-mail released January 14, 2005 (the day after
the report and recommendations were made public), Roy A.
Harrisville III, Executive Director of Solid Rock Lutherans,
condemned the report for failing to “reflect both the biblical faith of millions and the desire for a clear word from our
Church leadership.” Focusing on the third recommendation, he
wrote, “With this recommendation, the Task Force has stated
that sexual boundaries do not matter now, if they ever did.”
From the other side, our work was faulted for elevating church
unity over both truth and justice. Larry Rasmussen, a Lutheran
ethicist writing in The Network Letter, was particularly forceful in his criticism on this point. The outcome of years of work
by the task force was marked by an “absence of the spirit and
courage of a church of the Reformation” (4). Noting Luther’s
own confidence that “the living, active Word of God that suffuses all creation can and might bring us all to a new place, as a
church ever in need of reform,” he complained that “the daring,
the venturesomeness, and the creativity that mark this joyful
dynamic of Reformation freedom seem hedged about on every
side in the Task Force report” (4). The task force had, in his view,
“compromised the reformation” and “miss[ed] the chance to be
Lutheran” (4, 5).
Lost in sin as we all are, it is more than possible that some
or all of these negative assessments are accurate. Still, I cannot
escape the sense that most of what has been written and said
about our report fails to appreciate what may have been its most
7

important contribution: its effort to give substance and meaning
to the notion of the church as a community of moral deliberation. Of course, it is possible that we failed at that too, but that
is a conversation that is still waiting to happen.

Moral judgments, moral conflicts
Moral conflicts arise out of the nature of moral judgment. All
knowledge claims involve interpretation and judgment, even
simple descriptions of fact and even empirical, scientific findings. The role of judgment, or what Michael Polanyi calls the
personal coefficient of knowledge, is more obvious and more
dominant in the domains of religion, philosophy, and ethics than
in other spheres of human inquiry and conviction. All judgments
are subject to dispute by others who judge differently, but such
contestations are much more widespread in moral and religious
matters because (1) the realities in question are complex, difficult
to isolate, and comparatively elusive; (2) more people feel that
they know enough, on the basis of their own experience, to speak
out with an authoritative voice; and (3) the issues at stake cut so
incisively into their own action, self-understanding, and interests that people feel compelled by reason of their own integrity
to defend their views and convictions. The important thing to
understand here is that no amount of goodwill or education is
going to banish moral and religious disagreement.
Yet not all moral conflicts are alike. Conflicts arise for different reasons and the differences in cause have important implications for how, and even whether, the disagreement can be resolved.
1. Some arise from inadequate understanding of the situation or
defective reasoning about the situation. Conflicts of this sort
are usually able to be resolved through education and careful
critical analysis of the arguments offered by the opposing
sides. Fortunately, the majority of our disagreements (moral
and otherwise) are probably of this sort.
2. Some arise because of deeper conflicts about underlying
issues. These are harder to resolve because parties to the conflict first have to be brought to see that the ostensible subject
of disagreement is not the actual subject of disagreement, and
they then have to be willing to engage the conversation at the
proper level.
3. Some arise out of divergent judgments about the relative
weight (or the proper ordering and balancing) of competing high-level values. Disputes of this kind can be impossible to resolve (centuries of disagreement between pacifist
Christians and Christians who condone the carefully
regulated use of fatal force provide a familiar example here).

8 | Intersections | Spring 2006

4. Some arise from divergent styles of moral reasoning. Here
we might think of conflicts between ethicists who reason
primarily in terms of goals or ends and ethicists who reason
primarily from prima facie duties.2 Or we might think of
ethicists who start with Scripture and ask how it applies to
experience and ethicists who begin with experience and ask
how Scripture illuminates experience.
5. Some, it must be admitted, arise from sin, pride, sloth,
bigotry, self-indulgence, and other forms of self-centeredness,
viciousness, or bad faith.
In the discussion that follows, I am going to disallow appeal
to the fifth reason as a way of accounting for our current disputes—though I notice that many people do appeal precisely to
this explanation. I disallow it because (1) my own observations
do not support it and (2) Christian charity requires that we put
the best possible construction on the arguments of others.
The widespread disappointment reflects the fact that people
thought this controversy was of the first variety—that it was a
problem that could be resolved by concentrated study that would
reveal what the church ought to do. I thought that myself when
I began the work. But greater understanding has not yielded a
resolution of this conflict; it actually seems sometimes to deepen
the disagreement. Reflecting in his February 2005 newsletter
on “What We’ve Learned about Ourselves” as a result of the
years of study, Bishop Theodore Schneider noted that “there was
a strong belief and hope across the church that if we all shared
the same information we would be able to come to a consensus
of agreement. Simply put, the problem was thought to be one of
education.” The massive study efforts were not without effect.
“We have learned a great deal about one another and, I believe,
have come to a new appreciation of one another. But it does not
appear that many minds were changed, just as the same appears
to have been true on the Task Force itself.” And so, he concludes,
another thing that “we have already learned is this: We may well
live ourselves into change in this church and in our society, but
we shall never argue ourselves into it” (2).
While study and education are hardly useless in the present
case, it has become apparent that this controversy has deep and
various roots, not all of which are actually ethical. I happen to
have concluded that the controversy is primarily a controversy
of the second sort and that the underlying issues are not actually
moral or ethical at all, but for purposes of this article, it is not
important whether the controversy is of the second, third, or
fourth type. Whichever of these types it is, it is not a controversy that a task force can “settle” for the church. This is partly
because such conflicts sometimes do end at an impasse, but it is
mostly because where such deep and responsible disagreements

arise, the church, as a whole community, must struggle toward
a resolution. It cannot delegate that work to some subsidiary
agency in the way that the work of study or fact-finding can be
delegated. It was thus the considered judgment of the task force
that time, forbearance, and widespread conversation would be
required for this process to be carried through successfully—if
it can be carried through at all. That was why we began by
recommending that our church “concentrate on finding ways to
live together faithfully in the midst of our disagreements.” Our
second and third recommendations were offered as suggestions
as to how the church might conduct itself as that continuing
conversation unfolds.
Communities and their conflicts
Our recommendations notwithstanding, it is obvious that a
number of different courses are open to a community when
education and logical argument fail to persuade and produce
one-mindedness or consensus. Not all of them are mutually
exclusive, but only two of them seem conducive to the continuing dialogue and mutual discernment that distinguish a community of moral deliberation.
The most typical response is probably the determination
to overcome dissent by an exercise of power. It is possible (and
sometimes, for the common good, necessary) to compel obedience where agreement cannot be won by argument. Whether the
obedience one is compelling is obedience to traditional authority, the law of the land, the will of a powerful elite, or the will
of a voting majority, the method of resolution is the same. It is
certainly the case that human communities cannot get on in an
orderly way without such recourse to the exercise of power, but
it does not follow that all fractious disagreements are best dealt
with in this way. A defeated but unpersuaded faction can remain
a source of significant discord. Moreover, in voluntary associations, compelling people to do things can get a little tricky.
People are, after all, free to leave, and they often do.
Consequently, a true and final division of the house is
another way of coping with deep and abiding disagreement.
From its first meeting, the task force has been acutely aware that
a significant number of current ELCA members believe that
if other members cannot be brought to see moral truth as they
do, the appropriate outcome would be the separation of ELCA
Lutherans into smaller church bodies that are each more uniformly like-minded. If their interpretations and judgments do
not prevail, those who believe that Scripture demands the affirmation and rigorous enforcement of current teachings and policies pertaining to sexual conduct appear to be prepared to leave
the ELCA in order to form their own church. Should this occur,
the congregations electing to remain identified as the ELCA

would also constitute a more homogeneous church. In practice,
this sort of redrawing of system boundaries is a common way
of addressing intractable disputes in voluntary organizations,
and in practice, this resolution often follows attempts to resolve
disputes by an exercise of power. Of course, it should not be
overlooked that an announcement by part of a community that
they are moving toward separation is itself a fairly muscular exercise of power. Neither should it be overlooked that “church shopping” and the transition from “churched” to “unchurched” are
other manifestations of this same phenomenon. Such maneuvers
often seem more oriented toward comfort than toward peace
(as the bitterness and disdain that afflict the newly established
boundaries make plain). More importantly, if we habitually dissociate ourselves from people who see things differently, we may
actually diminish any possibility of rendering our views more
nearly true.
In the face of conflict, some members of a community may
respond by trying to de-escalate the issue, recasting it as one that
does not matter, or at least does not matter as much as (or in the
way that) others in the community think it does. On its surface,
this may seem like an irresponsible or even malicious technique
for buying peace by trivialization. Yet when bitter controversies
are fed (intentionally or unintentionally) by incendiary rhetoric,
false dichotomies, misrepresentation of contending arguments,
and unrelenting focus on worst-case scenarios, it can be a work
of grace to try to enhance the community’s sense of balance and
proportion. Such efforts represent something quite different
from relativistic laissez-faire, nor do they entail any abdication
of principle. They are, on the contrary, strategies that may be
essential to the restoration of the degree of community necessary
to allow honest and principled moral deliberation.
It is also open to a community to intentionally choose to
accommodate legitimate divergence (by which I mean wellgrounded, well-informed, principled disagreement) in order
to continue together in conversation in the hope (perhaps only
eschatological) that we may come to find some common ground.
The period of accommodation may be comparatively brief and
transitional or it may last for centuries. When Luther nailed his
theses to the door, he was not proposing to split the community;
he was inviting the community to talk together about difficult
and contentious issues—to recognize its own divisions and try
together to separate correctable corruption from legitimate
dispute. The history of the Reformation and its aftermath
teaches us how alien to human nature and to the infrastructure
of human organizations this notion of accommodative, deliberative peace actually is. On the Christian biblical understanding,
peace is not, as John Macquarrie points out, a normative, static
condition that is, from time to time, regrettably disrupted by
9

troublers of the communal equilibrium; rather, “peace is … a
process and a task as man moves from potentiality to realization” (19). Reflecting on Eph. 2:13, he continues, “When Christ
bequeathed the gift of peace to his followers and when as the
climax of the beatitudes he commended the peacemakers, we
can see in retrospect that this was not the promise of tranquillity
but the invitation to continue a costly work” (22). The work of
peace is the work of reconciliation.
The task force, as a microcosm of our church, could have,
after all its study, listening, and argument, tried to “settle the
question” by taking a vote and declaring the majority victorious and the majority’s views true. The task force did not do this,
and in retrospect I have come to think that that was our most
important contribution. I can make some guesses as to how such
a vote would have turned out, but I truly do not know—because
we never took it. We declined to exercise majority power out
of respect for the conscience of those who, by reason of conviction and integrity, found themselves to be of different minds.
In offering our church the report and recommendations that
we offered, the task force modeled its belief that we are a community, and that communities (1) should seek to operate by
consensus and (2) in the absence of consensus, do best if they
acknowledge and accommodate their conflicts rather than either
denying them or allowing them to flare into feuds.
Re-formation
Just as it is important not to identify peace with the absence of
conflict, so it is important not to equate peace with stasis. We
(the task force and the church at large) are in medias res—somewhere in the midst of one strand of the great, complex evolutionary process of being the church under the call of a living
God who moves and acts in history. This is always the case; the
current situation simply highlights this for us.
I have heard many people frame the problem in terms of
whether or not the church should change. The question is
not whether to change, but how to change. Even if the 2005
Churchwide Assembly had voted by an overwhelming majority to
affirm existing teachings, practices, and policies and to uniformly
enforce existing policies regarding lesbian and gay rostered
ministers, the church would have changed. It would have become
a church that, having scrutinized these teachings and all the
reasons that people give for disagreeing with these teachings, had
reaffirmed the teachings and policies in the face of that challenge
and without concession to it. It would, by its very intentional
act of reaffirming its received teachings, have become a church
different from the church of thirty to fifty years ago in which the
question simply did not come up because homosexual orientation
was not acknowledged and same-sex couples were invisible.
10 | Intersections | Spring 2006

Change can be good, neutral, or bad. Moreover, it can be
all three at once—not just because different observers view it
differently, but because the actual costs, burdens, and benefits
of change fall differently on different sectors of a community
and on different individuals. Change can be slow or rapid. Some
favor slow change; others favor rapid change. The more one has
invested in existing arrangements, the more one favors stability
and (if change cannot be avoided) slow or evolutionary change—
thus, people often become more averse to change as they age,
while the young sometimes seem to specialize in rebellion. There
are many other good reasons not to proceed precipitously (not
least among them the fallibility of human judgments about the
right and the good), and institutional churches (as contrasted
with more volatile and ephemeral religious movements) tend
to move very deliberately. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that
highly significant changes often occur long before they are
acknowledged, producing a kind of institutional cognitive dissonance or even something close to unintentional hypocrisy.
Social systems are extremely complex, and the impetus
toward change tends to arise not from within a single component of a given system but from the friction between systems,
between a comprehensive system and one or more internal
subsystems, or between subsystems within a comprehensive
system. Moreover, systems tend to have porous rather than rigid
boundaries, and people tend to be “resourced” by more than
one system (that is, we all participate in multiple social systems
and subsystems). Consequently, communal life and organizational systems are not characterized by unanimous agreement.
The affective bonds of loyalty and need are probably at least as
important in maintaining a cohesive social system as the bonds
arising from cognitive agreement. Yet in strong and durable
communities, there tends to be a strong, rich, and comparatively
comprehensive consensus (though this consensus ought probably to be thought about more on the model of what we might
call family relationships rather than on the model of universal
accord on a few central beliefs).3
“Consensus” is a hard word to define, but it is pretty clear
that our church, considered nationally and considered particularly in light of the recorded votes of the Assembly, no longer
has a strong consensus on the particular matter of just treatment
of Lutheran same-sex couples in monogamous lifelong relationships. Some on the task force felt that there is no emerging consensus either. I, in contrast, suspect (partly on the basis of those
votes at Churchwide Assembly4) that we are in fact seeing the
slow emergence of a new consensus, but if so, it is still years away.
In a just community, punishment of behaviors has to be backed
and legitimated by strong consensus as to the unacceptability of
the behavior in question; otherwise, the sanctions will seem to

many to be arbitrary, unfair, and discriminatory. In the absence
of consensus, the task force recommended that policy should
not be altered (implicitly, but not explicitly, acknowledging that
policy alteration should reflect consensus in the community).
However, the task force paired that respect for existing policy
with recommendations that this church (1) undertake the kind
of continuing dialogue that would allow either the emergence of
a new consensus or a “repristinization” of the old consensus and
(2) in the interim practice prudential deference and forbearance
in the enforcement of policies that came about under a consensus that no longer exists.
To the extent that ethics, policy, and leadership are always
most fundamentally “about” the management of change, they
demand great wisdom and discernment in differentiating among
(1) what needs to be protected and preserved for the good of
our common life, (2) what needs to be adapted or reinterpreted
or renewed or reformed, and (3) what can be or needs to be
relinquished or actively repudiated. As we have seen, the report
and recommendations of the task force were bound to disappoint those who considered the controversy to be resolvable
by careful study. However, if one thinks instead that the task
force was called to assist the church in addressing change and in
responding as Lutherans to conscientious and principled dissent,
the report and recommendations will seem, not necessarily more
satisfying, but less like a default or evasion. In Journey Together
Faithfully, Part 2, the task force exposed the degree to which
the church itself has already changed by displaying the range of
views held by faithful Lutherans—a portrait of the church that
was validated many times over by the debate and actions of the
Assembly. The recommendations themselves were built upon the
belief of the task force that we, as a church, are not at this time
able to clearly discern, with respect to this particular issue, what
needs to be protected and preserved, what needs to be renewed
or reformed, and what ought to be relinquished. Rather than
urging false closure, the task force urged continuing conversation in which all voices will be heard.

Features of the human condition
In speaking about judgment, about change and temporality,
and about the nature of social systems, I have already begun
the exploration of our situation as creaturely beings, but to
this I now want to add some specific insights from the work of
Hannah Arendt. In The Human Condition, first published in
1958 and continuously in print ever since, she begins with the
indisputable observation that human beings are conditioned
creatures; that is, we are the sort of creatures that exist in an
environment on which we are dependent for our existence as

the sort of creatures that we are. Although the conditions of
our creatureliness “never condition us absolutely” (11), they are,
nonetheless, the conditions of the possibility of our living and
acting at all. We forget them or deny them at our peril. What,
then, does she think these inexorable and empowering conditions are? “Life itself, natality and mortality, worldliness, plurality, and the earth” (11). Although she herself does not write from
a religious perspective, there is much that Lutherans can learn
from her treatment of our terrestrial, creaturely being—and
from her darker insight that although “the earth is the very
quintessence of the human condition,” human beings “[seem]
to be possessed by a rebellion against human existence as it has
been given” (2). It is possible, as she acknowledges, that science
and technology are in the process of actively altering the human
condition itself, but if we do not even know what it is that we
are altering (and she identifies “thoughtlessness” as “among the
outstanding characteristics of our time” [5]), we can hardly make
reliable judgments about the direction or the consequences of
that process. But leaving aside the question of whether human
beings can, in fact, alter the very conditions and limits of our
own conditioning reality, she confines herself “to an analysis of
those general human capacities which grow out of the human
condition and are permanent, that is, which cannot be irretrievably lost so long as the human condition is not changed” (6).
Life and earth require little explanation, but the other four
dimensions of the human condition require more elaboration.
Natality and mortality capture “the [biological] conditions
under which life has been given to man” (9). They can be gathered together as the two dimensions of earthliness. These she calls
“the most general conditions of human existence” (8). We are
finite, embodied, limited, perspective-bound creatures who grow,
change, reproduce ourselves, and eventually decay and die. We
must labor to sustain the biological processes that maintain life.
In these dimensions, the human condition is not different from
the conditions of all animal life, although we differ from the animals quite remarkably in our ways of meeting these necessities.
Worldliness names the uniquely human capacity to create
layers of reality that are not given with our biological condition: linguistic systems; laws and systems for their development,
amendment, and administration; markets, wealth, and money or
other media of exchange; electrical power grids and communication networks; industrial complexes; knowledge and methods of
inquiry that can be recorded and transmitted across geographical and temporal boundaries; social trust and moral expectations—to name only a few of the most obvious. We dwell in a
biological ecosystem, but we also dwell in a constructed “world”
of artefacts (Manhattan was not carved out of rock by natural
forces) and in a transhistorical web of unspecifiably complex
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mental, social, and operational systems. Worldliness comprises
our own “self-made conditions, which, their human origin and
their variability notwithstanding, possess the same conditioning
power as natural things” (9).
Plurality is “the condition of human action because we are
all the same, that is, human, in such a way that nobody is ever
the same as anyone else who ever lived, lives, or will live” (8). We
lose sight of the extraordinary gift of being different—probably
because so many of our most vexing problems arise out of this
gift. Arendt urges us to appreciate the fact that the alternative to
this would be a situation in which all human beings “were endlessly reproducible repetitions of the same model, whose nature
or essence was the same for all and as predictable as the nature
or essence of any other thing” (8). There would be no disagreement, no conflict, no dissonance, no interhuman tension, no
hierarchies, no equality (since that is distinct from sameness), no
surprises, no change, no action properly so called, no history, no
politics, no ethics, no evaluation, no failure, and no success. There
would be general laws and predictable behavior, and that is all.
The full appreciation of the conditions of worldliness and
plurality conveys an additional coloration upon the condition of
natality. We are born as biological creatures requiring biological
sustenance, but every infant arrives as a stranger and a potential actor capable of bringing about something new: “the new
beginning inherent in birth can make itself felt in the world
only because the newcomer possesses the capacity of beginning
something anew, that is, of acting. In this sense of initiative, an
element of action, and therefore of natality, is inherent in all
human activities” (9).

The church’s educational mission
Reflection on our creatureliness makes it hard to sustain the
dream of perfect harmony as anything other than an eschatological hope. It helps us to see why the only peace for which we
can hope is fissured and unstable, a temporal possibility best
understood, as Macquarrie has reminded us, as an endless,
difficult, and costly process, not a situation or achievement.
Understanding peace in this way, we might think together about
how the “ministry and advocacy” of peace might be folded into
our college’s educational mission as something other than pious
exhortations to beat swords into plowshares and make war no
more. We might begin by simply asking how the colleges can
help to create a vibrant community of moral deliberation in
which dividing walls are broken down, coercion is reserved for
“last resort,” and inspirited care and respect crowd out recrimination and abuse.
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Worldliness
“World” is through and through communal. The great articulate systems that constitute the fabric of our human lives are
received through education. Education is the memory and the
life and the future of these systems, and every educative object
and event (every conversation, every examination, every book,
every syllabus, every classroom exchange) both preserves the
received system and changes it, forming the newcomers for their
own work of preservation and reformation. Taking “worldliness”
seriously not only enriches our understanding of the critical
importance of what we do as teachers but also suggests that we
might do well to centralize, perhaps as a feature of our general
education curriculum, courses that explore the nature, function,
meaning, indispensability, frictions, and operations of human
social systems. Lutheran colleges might even facilitate Christian
community by enabling their students to see the church as just
such a social system (it may be far more than that, but it is most
definitely at least that): a living community of word and action,
not some sort of sea-bottom sedimentary “deposit of faith.”
Courses that stress the interrelations of individuals and communities (the dependence of individuals on their communities,
the frictions between the individual and the community, the
responsibilities of individuals for the preservation and adaptation of their communities) might help our graduates not only to
function better in the civic world but also to exercise more effective lay and professional leadership in the church itself.
Earthliness
We are finite, limited, embodied, perspective-bound creatures
who see partially and imperfectly. While we all offer lip service
to this notion, left to our own devices most of us operate as if we
were the sole possessors of truth and as if some neon light had
gone on in the sky assuring us that our judgments are endorsed
by God. If as educators we were to take our earthliness seriously,
we would spend a lot more time helping our students understand
that human moral and intellectual claims are judgments, not
some kind of transcriptions of truth read off reality as we might
copy out a passage from a book. And if we go out of our way to
teach our students that human moral and intellectual claims are
judgments, we must, of course, go even further out of our way
to help our students make discriminations between judgments
that are (comparatively) suspect and unreliable and judgments
that are (comparatively) trustworthy and reliable. In the face of
entrenched American anti-intellectualism and postmodern universalized suspicion, we must encourage respect for expertise and
other forms of earned authority. But we must pair this emphasis
on deference to legitimate authority and proven wisdom with
companion emphasis on the responsibility to actively engage

that authority and wisdom patiently, critically, and discerningly.
Conscience is not passively received; it is actively formed, and it
is because it is so closely linked with personal integrity that we
speak of it as inviolable (but not infallible). By way of the portal
of conscience we can, as educators, reopen the discussion of tolerance, not as a political expediency, but as itself a fully defined
virtue, an excellence grounded in a Christian understanding of
creation and a bulwark against idolatry.
Mortality
We are temporal creatures in a temporal, historical world. The
lives of persons, organizations, institutions, and civilizations
have an arc that rises, peaks, and deteriorates. Nothing endures
that does not change, and some things that change do not
endure. For that reason, we might consider making it our goal
to see that no student graduates with a bachelor’s degree from a
Lutheran college without having developed a refined historical
consciousness. Could we offer more courses in history—perhaps
history across the curriculum? Could we require more history
or at least more courses that work historically? We should do
less comparing of snapshots (this was Rome, this was feudal
Europe, this was the Renaissance) and more looking at historical change, the evolution of social systems, and their interplay.
How did this group of people actually get from A to B? While
it certainly continues to be important to study religions in light
of typological differences and to examine religious beliefs and
practices on their own merits, could we do a better job of studying Christianity as it changes over time? Where this is done at
all, it tends to be done as a study in the history of ideas, but we
need also to study Christian beliefs, teachings, and practices as
they change in relation to changes in economics, migrations, or
political arrangements—and in relation to the social situation of
the members of particular church bodies.
Natality
Our students are the natal horde of newcomers, the strangers who are only partially at home in the world that we have
ourselves received, sustained, and remade. They both ardently
seek assimilation into our world(s) and rebelliously resist it. We
know them, at some deep level of our teacherly hearts, as both
our hope and our enemy. If the things we treasure, and the fabric
of memory and understanding that we represent and preserve,
are to persist into the unfathomable future, they will have to be
preserved and transmitted by these alternately sullen and receptive, alternately passionate and indifferent, young people hidden
under their baseball caps in the back row. These memories, these
interpretations, these intentions will have to be adapted and
nurtured by this rising generation as our generation has adapted

and nurtured them. And these young people, as they take these
gifts from our hands, will change, and perhaps discard, what
we have spent our lives on, just as, in so spending our lives,
we changed and sometimes lost, sometimes rejected what we
received. The blessing in all this is that they will, in speech and
action, renew and reconstruct these traditions as they make
them their own.
Plurality
There are six billion of us and we are all (despite the degree of
our genetic similarity) remarkably different. We come from
different social worlds; even within the same social world,
people have different experiences depending on their race, their
sexuality, their class and status, and innumerable other factors.
We live in multiple social worlds and “speak” multiple symbolic
languages. Lutherans are different from the unchurched and
from other Christians; Lutherans are, let us not forget, different
from Lutherans.
I would like to see Lutheran colleges make a concerted
attempt to supplement our course offerings in the traditional
study of epistemology with attentiveness to American pragmatism and with careful and informed study of the sociology
of knowledge. I have noticed over the years that scholars with
religious commitments (and certainly religious leaders writing
for broad publics) tend to demonize pragmatism and the sociology of knowledge as subjectivistic and relativistic endeavors that
undermine or deny the validity of moral judgments and human
efforts to sort out truth from error. This represents a very unfortunate misunderstanding of both American pragmatism and
the serious attempts now underway to study human knowledge
claims contextually. We are not obliged to choose sides between
the spineless relativists and what William James called “absolutism.” Scholars and scientists have been busy for a century and a
half developing alternatives to this false dichotomy. However, if
so many opinion-shapers have somehow overlooked this development, it seems likely that we are not doing a very good job of
teaching it.
In addition, taking plurality seriously implies that we
welcome conflict for what it is: testimony to our individual
uniqueness and the wellspring of our freedom. Conflict and
controversy are often signs of the health of a community, not
an index of its decay (though if space permitted, it would be
important to differentiate constructive conflict that builds up,
adapts, and revitalizes a community from the kind of conflict
that is implicated in the collapse of social systems). In any social
system (or sub-system), the fundamental resources of the community include interpretations of reality that form the conceptual framework and horizon of both thought and practice.
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The inexhaustible richness of earth and world alike continually
outruns or overflows any and every attempted human account.
It is unquestionably the responsibility of educators to bring
order to the “booming, buzzing confusion” of human experience. It is our responsibility to find the narrative threads that
make the past meaningful. It is our work to identify patterns
and to sort out the coherent from the incoherent. But we must
be careful, even as we go about that work, to acknowledge the
provisional evolving nature of our interpretations and to honor
the human condition of plurality by equipping our students to
deal resourcefully and fearlessly with change and variability.
When human beings build systems (whether conceptual or
social), there will always be anomalies—features of reality that
cannot readily be fitted into the pattern. These anomalies are,
usually in small ways but sometimes in major ways, threats to
the integrity and sustainability of the system; fears, along with
our deep desire for orderliness and control, more often than
not lead us to “forget” or paper over or even falsify these signals
of fragility and limitation. We want, instead, to inspire in our
students the courage to acknowledge the anomalies and to read
them accurately for what they can tell us about the limitations
and vulnerabilities of our nonetheless indispensable convictions
and social arrangements.

Coda
Conflict, disagreement, divergence in interpretation and judgment concerning the true, the good, the beautiful, and the
right—these are indelible features of the human condition and
the fissures in the face of peace. We cannot make them disappear. We should not even want to make them disappear, because
they are part and parcel of our humanity, our creatureliness.
We can, however, try to prevent them from becoming sources of
destruction. We can try to prevent these fissures from turning
into rifts and hostilities that break us apart and isolate us, one
from another. We can try to prevent them from turning into the
fractures and hatreds that destroy our peace.
The task force, in one small document, has offered our church
our hope that this may be so. In a much larger way, over a much
longer time, in more varied contexts, and possibly with much
greater success, Lutheran colleges may also foster this hope. This,
it seems to me, though I certainly see only “through a darkened
glass,” is how the work and learnings of the task force might
contribute to reflection on “the Lutheran calling in education.”
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Endnotes
1. This article is derived from a paper titled “The ELCA Study on
Sexuality: Lessons for the Church’s Educational Mission,” which was
originally delivered July 31, 2005, at the conference The Vocation of
a Lutheran College: The Lutheran Calling in Education, at Capital
University in Columbus, OH. The conference was sponsored by the
ELCA Division for Higher Education and Schools.
2. For an important argument that the apparent conflict of these
distinctive ways of reasoning might be overcome by imaging the moral
life interactionally in terms of man-the-answerer, see chap. 1 of
H. Richard Niebuhr’s The Responsible Self.
3. I am regretfully aware of the inadequacies of this brief paragraph.
For a full and very illuminating sociological discussion of social organization, see John Bowker’s rich and incisive essay “Religions as Systems.”
For a political treatment of the notion of “overlapping consensus”
(common ground achieved in relation to, or in spite of, continuing
disagreements), see John Rawls’s Political Liberalism.
4. Fifty-eight percent of the voting members rejected a substitute
motion reserving “the solemnizing and blessing of sexual unions. . .
for the marriage of a man and a woman.” Thirty-eight percent voted in
favor of a substitute motion that would have removed all policy barriers
“to rostered service for otherwise qualified persons in same-gender,
covenanted relationships that are ‘mutual, chaste, and faithful.’” The
third resolution from the Church Council was affirmed by fully fortynine percent of those voting, even though it was opposed by Lutherans
Concerned (because it routed the path to ministry through a process
of applying to be considered an “exception”) and therefore probably
lost the votes of some, perhaps many, who support the rostering of gays
and lesbians in committed relationships. These votes would have been
unimaginable even twenty years ago.
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ADINA NACK

Sexuality over the Lifespan—Social Trends Pose
Moral Dilemmas for Communities of Faith1
AS A SOCIOLOGY PROFESSOR who teaches a course in
sexuality at an ELCA institution, I was honored by the invitation to present to the ELCA Task Force for Studies on Sexuality.
I enjoyed the interactions as both an educator and a student. I
am neither a Lutheran nor a theologian, and I found it fascinating to learn about the process and outcomes of Journey Together
Faithfully, Part Two, and about the ongoing process behind the
production of Journey Together Faithfully, Part Three. I understood that, while homosexuality had been the primary focus of
the previous document, this new document aimed to address the
ELCA’s position on other dimensions of sexuality.
My primary role at this meeting was that of a sexuality studies educator. As a researcher, scholar, and professor, I am also
informed by past professional experiences as a sexual health
educator. I view sexuality as an innate part of being human.
In addition to serving the obvious function of reproduction,
sexuality can be a source not only of pleasure and intimacy but
also of guilt, shame, and fear. From a health education perspective, I see sexuality as a basic component of human health and
well-being. From a sociological perspective, I examine how
our culture shapes sexual norms (behavioral expectations) and
values. I also focus on how our sexual practices transform the
societies in which we live.
As we progress through our lives, each of us makes sexual
decisions based on knowledge, experiences, and values. Physical
changes, developmental concerns, and social factors shape our
experiences of sexuality as we age. In this article, I draw on

empirical research from the social, behavioral, and life sciences
to highlight key findings about the learned components of
sexuality from puberty through late adulthood. In particular,
I will focus on three aspects of sexuality that the ELCA Task
Force found to be particularly relevant and controversial for
their parishioners: premarital sexuality, sexuality after divorce,
and nonmarital sexuality in late adulthood. I will present some
of the key research findings that pertain to these topics and
conclude each section with questions that reflect concerns raised
in the Task Force discussions.

Premarital Sexuality:
Adolescence through Early Adulthood
From birth, we are sexual beings: we learn from our bodies what
feels good or bad, and we learn from our parents, pastors, and
others what is right and wrong. By the time we reach puberty,
about 40% of girls and 38% of boys have masturbated (Bancroft).
In addition to the sensual components of sexuality, we have also
learned the gender components: the feminine and masculine
norms of sexuality that tell us what is right or wrong for girls and
for boys.

Sexuality in Adolescence
Biologists define puberty as the developmental stage in which the
human body becomes capable of reproduction. Social and behavioral scientists define adolescence as the psychological and social
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state that takes place from the start of puberty and lasts until
full adult status is attained. Sexually, this is a time of growth
and confusion, with the body often maturing faster than
the corresponding emotional and intellectual capabilities.
Hormonal changes bring about a dramatic increase in sexual
interest, with increasing incidences of masturbation.
The “sexual revolution” of the 1960s marked a major shift in
adolescent sexual norms, and the age of first intercourse began
to decrease. By 2002, researchers found that the average age for
men’s first intercourse was 16.9 years old, and the average age
for women’s was 17.4 years old. One disturbing aspect of this
trend was the report of coercive sex: about 22% of teenage girls
described their first intercourse as unwanted. Another finding
was the demise of a long-standing trend of female teen peer pressure to abstain from premarital intercourse. Today’s teen girls
are more likely than in a previous generation to encourage each
other to become sexually active during their high-school years
(Alan Guttmacher Institute 2002).
Today’s United States teens come of age in an era of conflicting messages about sexuality: the overwhelming majority will
receive abstinence-only sex education, while living in a social
context where mainstream media normalizes increasingly graphic
and permissive portrayals of teen sexual intercourse. While
our federal government continues to increase funding for abstinence-only sex education, numerous well-respected studies have
concluded that abstinence-only education does not significantly
lower the age of first intercourse, reduce STDs, or reduce unintended pregnancies among teens (Contraception Report).
In contrast, comprehensive or “abstinence-plus” sexuality education has been found to be highly effective (Kirby, Office of the
Surgeon General), yet few United States school districts offer
these curricula.

Sexuality in Early Adulthood
Young adults grapple with many developmental concerns
related to sexuality: such as how to integrate love and sex, how
to commit to intimate relationships, how to make childbearing
decisions, and how to protect their sexual health. The post-high
school years are a prime time to develop a sexual philosophy
because many young adults move out of their family home to
pursue educational and career goals. With this newfound freedom and independence, many young adults find themselves reevaluating the religious standards of sexual morality with which
they were raised. Studies have found that most college students
expect to engage in sexual intercourse during their undergraduate years and that this sex will take place within loving relationships (Sprecher and McKinney; Sprecher 2002).

Researchers have noted several social shifts that have transformed the sexual landscape for single, young adults. In general,
the past few decades have seen a sharp increase in the average age
of first marriage. One reason is that more young adults are the
children of divorce and do not want to rush into marriage. In
addition, longer periods of education and training are required
for many career options. For reasons of either self-fulfillment or
economic necessity, more women want to establish their careers
before marriage: it is increasingly impractical for one spouse to
be the breadwinner.
Historically, young adults in the United States found it more
reasonable to abstain from sexual intercourse until marriage
when first marriages occurred at younger ages: the typical period
of abstinence may have been only three to five years (from the
end of puberty to the beginning of marital sex). This trend of
later marriages has supported the normalization of premarital
sex and cohabitation. Cohabitation has become a common part
of young adult life, as many opt to defer marriage. Half will have
cohabited by age thirty (Strong). “Living in sin,” has become
“living together.” The moral and social sanction is nonexistent
in the minds of many Americans. However, monogamy is still
valued. A 2004 ABC News poll found that 80% of young singles
are exclusively dating one person.
The most significant difference between cohabiting same-sex
couples and heterosexual couples is that the heterosexuals can
legally marry. Another key difference concerns social support for
a same-sex couple’s commitment to each other. While most parents of heterosexual young adults give their children a “pro-marriage” message, research finds that parents are much less likely
to urge their gay or lesbian child to commit to a stable same-sex
relationship (Peplau). This study found that most young adults,
no matter their sexual orientation, desire an intimate, loving
relationship with another person.
Today’s young singles have greater sexual experience during
their adolescence, feel less shame and stigma about premarital
sex, and have more options to prevent unintended pregnancies.
However, partly due to insufficient sex education, the United
States has witnessed a rise in unintended pregnancies and sexually transmitted diseases among the young adult population. In
the broader sense of sex education, sexual health educators and
researchers have also noticed a disturbing trend in how young
adults today approach the trajectory of sexual intimacy. Popular
metaphors, such as those about baseball and advancing through
the bases on the way to a “homerun” of intercourse, no longer
apply to today’s teens and young adults. In a world of abstinenceonly education, sexual “abstinence” has become a strangely
defined term. Studies reveal that oral sex has become normalized as the behavior one advances to after kissing, and that anal
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intercourse is a preferable precursor to vaginal intercourse (Alan
Guttmacher Institute 2000). While both of these behaviors
carry considerable risk for disease transmission, many believe
that their virginity is still “intact” as long as penile-vaginal intercourse has not occurred. Sexual health educators are concerned
that teens and young adults are not being educated about the
full range of sexual behaviors that are less risky than penetrative
forms of intercourse: for example, mutual masturbation, sensual
massage, and manual stimulation.

Questions to Consider:
• What role should the church play in providing sexuality
education, and what type(s) of education should it provide?
• What role should the church play in advising which types of
sexual activities are morally and spiritually right for young
adults in dating relationships?
• With the normalization of premarital sex and cohabitation,
what moral and spiritual guidance can the church offer to
adults who may not marry until they are in their thirties or
who may never marry?
• Should the church recognize and bless those young adults who
are cohabiting and in committed monogamous relationships?

Nonmarital Sexuality:
Sexuality Issues of Divorce and Single Parenthood
Our social, religious, and legal institutions continue to view
marriage as the relationship in which sexuality is legitimate.
However, many United States adults struggle as their sexuality is shaped by realities of divorce and/or single parenting.
Demographics reveal a rise in the number of single-parent
families and a growth in post-divorce singles. These adults are
increasingly deciding to reenter the dating scene, only to discover that there are distinct sexual challenges.
In middle adulthood, individuals often find themselves
grappling with developmental concerns such as the biological
aging process. The consequences of divorce present additional
challenges: stigmatization, decrease in income, and emotional
distress. When children are involved, additional stressors factor
into decisions to date again.
Engaging in sexual behavior with someone following a separation or divorce is significant. Sexual intimacy with a new partner symbolizes that previous vows are no longer valid. Often,
the renewal of a sex life helps adults to accept their single status.
However, many religious teachings do not approve of sex outside
of marriage, and many divorcees feel anxious about their sexuality. Personally, they may be fearful of becoming physically and
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emotionally vulnerable with a new partner. Those who have had
a long marriage may feel out of touch with the current norms of
dating and sex. On the plus side, post-divorce sexual experiences
have been linked to increased well-being (Spanier).

Single Parenting
As the results of both divorce and unmarried births, about 30% of
families are headed by single parents (Fields). Familial responsibilities often mean that single parents are not part of the “singles
world.” They lack the leisure time and money to invest in dating.
Research shows that divorced adults’ sexual decisions are directly
affected by the presence of children. For example, divorced women
who are childless are more likely to be sexually active than those
who are parents (Stack). Single parents are often concerned about
the morality that they are modeling for their children.
Conscious of being role models, single parents find it more
complicated when negotiating the world of dating. Social
stereotypes about single men and women often include the trait
of promiscuity. Many single parents do not want their children
to view them as sexual beings. This results in difficult decisions
about how much of their lives they can share with their dates. In
particular, they face tough decisions about whether their dates
will be allowed to meet their children and whether overnight
dates are appropriate.

Questions to Consider:
• What role should the church play in advising which types of
sexual activities are morally and spiritually right for divorced
adults in dating relationships?
• Divorced adults may have financial and familial reasons
for not wanting to remarry. Should the church recognize
and bless committed, monogamous relationships between
divorced adults?
• How should single parents determine what is right or wrong
in terms of their sexual choices and the impact those choices
have on their children?

Sexuality in Late Adulthood:
Marital and Nonmarital Concerns
As individuals enter late adulthood, they find themselves needing to adjust to the process of aging. People may not be sexually
active throughout their entire lives, but they remain sexual
beings. Sexual feelings and behaviors can be healthy throughout
the lifespan. Good sexual relationships can provide intimacy
and human connections that help ease the pain of aging, loss of
health, and loss of loved ones.

Sexual Stereotypes of Aging
In our society, we associate sexuality with youth and the ability
to procreate. The sexuality of older adults tends to be invisible.
Society either discounts or denies their sexuality. These beliefs
contribute to a view of old age as a depressing time of life when
one is unlikely to be a part of a fulfilling, intimate relationship.
Negative stereotypes can also produce negative body image in
older adults who may have absorbed social messages that their
aging bodies are no longer “sexy.”
In reality, research shows that many older adults experience
high levels of satisfaction and well-being. The varied aspects
of sexuality – emotional, sensual, and relational – are enjoyed
regardless of age. For example, a 1998 survey conducted by the
National Council on the Aging found that 66% of adults age
sixty or older reported that their sex life was equal to or better
than it had been when they were in their forties.

Health and Partner Availability
The most significant determinants of an older individual’s sexual
activity are illnesses and partner availability. Health can affect
sexual behaviors in many different ways. One common example
is that medications may produce “sexual side effects” that render
the person less capable or incapable of experiencing sexual pleasure. In addition, increasing frailty and chronic illnesses, such
as osteoporosis and heart disease, may limit mobility, strength,
stamina, and/or make a person fearful of sexual exertion. Some
of the normal physiological changes of aging also impact sexuality by manifesting as slower sexual response, impotency, and vaginal changes (for example, loss of elasticity and lubrication). On
the flip side, physicians report that a healthy sex life can promote
overall health and well-being for older adults (Cross).
Availability of partners plays a major role in how older adults
experience sexuality. It is well documented that the majority
of women outlive the majority of men in the United States. In
contrast to older women, older men have significantly more
opportunities to pursue opposite-sex relationships (Carr).
Approximately four out of five women who are seventy-five or
older do not have a male sexual partner. In contrast, over 60%
of the men in this age group do have a partner (AARP). The
consequences of this gender gap have both personal and public
health ramifications. With the advent of prescription drugs (for
example, Viagra) that aid male erections, older men are more
sexually active than in past generations. Drug-enhanced stamina
paired with the gender gap makes it likely for partner-sharing to
occur, such that each older man may have two or three female
sexual partners who are within his peer group. Public health
problems are magnified when older men seek out the services

of prostitutes and bring sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV, back to their senior girlfriends. In December 2004,
a CNN televised special to commemorate World AIDS Day
included a segment on the recent outbreaks of HIV/AIDS in
Florida retirement communities (“Staying Alive”). Drugs like
Viagra, coupled with generational norms against condom use,
the absence of fertility issues, and traditional gender norms (for
example, men being sexually assertive and females being sexually
passive) have produced a current cohort of United States senior
citizens who are at high risk for sexually transmitted infections.

Questions to Consider:
• Why are many so offended by the idea of older people wanting to be sexual?
• How might disparaging attitudes about aging and sexuality
negatively impact the “golden years” of a marriage?
• What role can or should the church play in dispelling myths,
building confidence, and giving older adults permission to
be sexual?
•	Given that many single older adults have pensions and other
financial circumstances that make remarriage not a viable
option, should the church recognize and bless their committed, monogamous relationships?

Conclusions
Over time throughout cultures, sexuality has been shaped by
gender roles (social expectations for men and women), marital
norms, and beliefs about homosexuality. Different religious texts
give some guidance as to what is morally and spiritually right.
The majority of Judeo-Christian writings on sexuality emphasize the sacredness of sex within the bonds of marriage and the
sinfulness of infidelity. However, marriage is an ever-evolving
institution, and it is vital that communities of faith consider the
contemporary institution of marriage in the United States and
its corresponding impact on sexuality norms and values. In discussing key sexuality issues throughout three major stages in the
life-span, I have tried to illuminate some current social phenomena and hypothesize the challenges for communities of faith.
One of the difficulties in talking about sexuality – in any
context – is that there is little agreement as to what constitutes
“healthy sexuality.” In 2002, the World Health Organization
defined sexual health as “the state of physical, emotional, mental,
and social well-being related to sexuality.” This definition takes
us beyond the mere absence of disease or dysfunction. This
conceptualization requires a positive and respectful approach to
sexuality and sexual relationships. The focus is not only about
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the freedom from coercion, but also about the freedom to experience safe and pleasurable sexual experiences. If we are willing
to consider a broader definition of healthy sexuality within the
social context of contemporary trends, then communities of
faith face difficult decisions. Does the pursuit of healthy sexuality put one at odds with long-standing religious doctrines? Can
the church convince parishioners that modern sexual norms
and values are wrong? Or, is it worth considering how religious
morality can be preserved in a society with ever-evolving beliefs,
attitudes, and behaviors about sexuality? I commend the ELCA
for having taken a leadership role in promoting open, honest,
and often difficult discussions about sexuality and look forward
to reading Journey Together Faithfully, Part Three.

Endnotes
1. I wish to thank the members of the ELCA Task Force for Studies
on Sexuality for their helpful comments and suggestions during my
presentation on February 4, 2006 (Chicago, IL). Address correspondence to Adina Nack, Department of Sociology, #3800, California
Lutheran University, Thousand Oaks, CA 91360-2700; e-mail: nack@
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Ritva WIlliams

Ethical Deliberation and the Biblical Text—
A Lutheran Contribution to Reading the Bible
THE GOAL OF THIS PAPER is to articulate a method of ethical
deliberation about a particular social issue. Over the last seven and
one-half years, I have been asked many times to speak about the
issue of the Bible and homosexuality, to lead workshops on the issue,
and to facilitate the ELCA study Journeying Together Faithfully.
These experiences have led to the realization that there is a great deal
of confusion and misunderstanding about the nature of the Bible
and the way it functions as scripture. In response I have been working at articulating a Lutheran “critical traditionalist” hermeneutic.
My intention in this paper is to test this hermeneutic by using it to
critique Robert Gagnon’s reading of Rom. 1:18-32 and to provide
an alternative reading of the same text, reflecting briefly on the
theological-ethical implications of this method. Before turning to
that task, however, it is necessary to explain how and why this has
become an issue of importance for me by reflecting briefly on my
own social location and agenda.
I am a professor and scholar of the New Testament and
Christian origins at Augustana College, an ELCA liberal arts
college where I hold tenure and serve as the Chair of the Religion
Department. In the eyes of many this makes me an “expert.” In
terms of education, income, and other socio-economic indicators
my profession places me in the upper middle class, a position I was
not born into, but which enables me to enjoy material comforts that
sometimes prick at my conscience. My relatively privileged status
is further enhanced by the fact that I am a white, heterosexual,
Christian wife and mother living in a country where those factors
are valued (Holtmann 27-28).1 On the other hand, I am a vertically

challenged person in a world where just about every material object
that we use in our day-to-day lives appears to have been designed by
and for tall, taller, and excessively tall persons. Of necessity, therefore, I see and experience the world from a “different” perspective.
As a female I am intensely aware of how under-represented women
are in the academy and in the church, especially in leadership positions. Even when we are admitted to the inner circles, all too often
we remain the “other” at the table. For me personally, this translates
into a sense of liminality, of being poised at a threshold with one
foot on either side. The sense of being simultaneously both an
insider and an outsider is intensified by the fact that I am an immigrant twice over, having been born in Finland, raised in Canada,
and now living and working as a resident alien in the United States.
It is natural for me, therefore, to feel a certain affinity and empathy
for persons who struggle at the peripheries of society. The combination of those feelings with a Lutheran theology of the cross has
convinced me that I am called to stand intentionally in solidarity
with the oppressed. Thus, I have come gradually to see my role as an
educator as consciousness-raising about and advocacy for those who
are marginalized. It is in context of doing just that that questions
about the ethics of biblical interpretation have become significant.

A Lutheran Critical Traditionalist Hermeneutic
“Critical traditionalist” is a phrase borrowed from my Hebrew
Bible professor, Dr. Robert Polzin. He originally coined the
term “critical traditionalism” to label what he saw as the dominant voice within the Deuteronomistic history. He writes, “The
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ultimate semantic authority of the Book of Deuteronomy […]
proclaims an attitude toward the word of God that claims
the right to emphasize now one aspect, viz., judgment, now
another aspect, viz., mercy, of God’s relationship with Israel,
depending on the situation in which they find themselves”
(Polzin 68). Polzin asserts that the overriding hermeneutical
perspective of the Deuteronomist is that “subsequent revisionary interpretation” is not only necessary, but modeled by
Moses himself in such a way that opposing views are nevertheless allowed to have their say (Polzin 205-206). Critical traditionalism, therefore, is a biblically grounded hermeneutical
perspective that recognizes the need for constant revision and
varying interpretations of core traditions as contexts change
through space and over time.
It is my contention that Lutheran biblical hermeneutics have
from their inception reflected such a critical traditionalism. For
Luther, the Word of God refers in the primary sense to “the
eternal Logos, the son of God” who became personally incarnate
in the historical person of Jesus of Nazareth, and secondly to
the proclaimed Word of God through which creation occurred
and salvation was announced. The Bible as the written Word
of God is “the definitive documentary on both the incarnation
and oral revelation of God’s Word” (Lazareth 33-34). Scripture is
thus the word of God in a secondary or derivate sense (Lotz 263).
Its authority derives, not so much from what it says literally,
but from its ability to re-present and re-embody the life-giving
Word. While it is, in Luther’s words, the “queen” that “must
rule, and everyone must obey,” Scripture remains the servant of
“the Lord who is the King of Scripture” (Lotz 264).2 In other
words, “Scripture cannot rightly be interpreted in opposition to
Christ’s person and work” (Lotz 263).
Given this understanding of scripture, a Lutheran critical
traditionalist hermeneutic must have at least three major components to it. First, it must honor scripture as Queen of the church
by taking seriously what biblical texts say, and, even more
importantly, what they mean. One way to get at that meaning is to answer the question, “who says what to whom about
what under what circumstances for what purposes.” The answer
necessitates paying attention, not only to the genre and rhetoric
of a passage, but also to the historical, social, and cultural circumstances addressed by, reflected in, and which gave rise to it.
Second, a Lutheran critical traditionalist hermeneutic must be
ever mindful of Christ, who is the King of scripture, and whose
mission is the purpose of the church. The good news about
justification by grace through faith in Jesus Christ functions as
the primary criteria for deciding whether a biblical passage is
relevant to our contemporary circumstances and how it might
be used in teaching and preaching.
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Finally, a Lutheran critical traditionalist hermeneutic holds
us ethically accountable by demanding that we reflect on both
the faithfulness and the consequences of our reading. Does our
interpretation respect the text as articulated in its originating
historical context? Does our reading and application of scripture
promote the mission of Christ? What are the consequences
of our interpretation with respect to race, ethnicity, economics, gender, sexuality, self-determination, and so forth? Will
it be life-giving or death-dealing? For whom? Why? Indeed
these may be the most important questions that we need to ask
ourselves as we read, interpret, and attempt to apply scripture in
our daily lives.

The Use of Romans 1:18-32
by Robert Gagnon
In The Bible and Homosexual Practice: Texts and Hermeneutics,
Robert Gagnon sets out to demonstrate that the Bible unequivocally defines same-sex intercourse as sin, and that there are no
valid hermeneutical arguments for overriding biblical authority
in this matter. His position is that “same-sex intercourse constitutes an inexcusable rebellion against the intentional design of
the created order.” It is not only degrading to the participants
but is physically, morally, and socially destructive (Gagnon 37).
Gagnon’s book is, thus, not about proclaiming the gospel but
about laying down the law that will protect the purity and security of the communities with which he identifies.
For Gagnon, the credibility of the Bible’s stance on this
subject is rooted in the revelatory authority of scripture, the
witness of nature to which the Bible points, and arguments
from experience, reason, and science (Gagnon 41). It is not my
intention to review the entire book but to focus on Gagnon’s
treatment of Rom. 1:24-27, which for him is the central text on
which Christians must base their moral doctrine on homosexual conduct (Gagnon 229). As he describes it, this passage
is the most substantial and explicit discussion of the subject
in the Bible: it is in the New Testament, it explicitly refers to
lesbianism, and it occurs within a significant body of material
originating from a single writer. Romans 1:24-27 is also in his
estimate “the most difficult text for proponents of homosexual
behavior to overturn” (Gagnon 230). For Gagnon then, this
is the authoritative text because of (a) its location in the Bible
specifically in the New Testament (do we detect a supersessionist theology here?), (b) its content, that is, what it says, (c) its
apostolic authorship, and (d) its perceived unassailability by
proponents of homosexuality.
Gagnon begins by placing the specific passage (Rom. 1:24-27)
within its larger literary context (Rom. 1:18-32), which he asserts

is Paul’s depiction of “what life used to be like before believing in Christ and receiving the Spirit but which has now been
fundamentally transformed for those who are in Christ. It portrays the predicament of all unsaved humanity” (Gagnon 245).
Within that larger context, Paul employs a typical HellenisticJewish critique of gentile sin in Rom. 1:18-32 in order to set up
an imaginary Jewish dialogue partner who rejects Paul’s law-free
gospel for Gentiles and regards Torah observance as excusing himself from God’s judgment. Gagnon argues that Paul’s
purpose is to show that God’s verdict is just and right because
the Gentiles knowingly act contrary to the knowledge of God’s
intentions that is available to them in creation by engaging in
idolatry and same-sex intercourse (Gagnon 246-47). Gagnon
seeks, thus, to answer the basic exegetical question of who says
what to whom about what in what circumstances for what purposes. He correctly identifies the genre of the passage as a typical
Hellenistic-Jewish critique of Gentiles, but fails to explore the
implications of Paul’s use of such a stereotype and misconstrues
Paul’s audience and purpose.
Gagnon’s treatment of Rom. 1:26-27 is based on drawing
out the parallels between idolatry and same-sex eroticism. He
asserts that just as “idolatry is a deliberate suppression of the
truth available to pagans in the world around them…so too is
same-sex intercourse” (Gagnon 254). What connects these two
for Gagnon is Paul’s use of the phrase “contrary to nature.” His
argument is that just as visual perception of the material world
should lead to a mental perception of the God who created it,
so visual perception of male-female bodily complementarity
should lead to an understanding of the rightness of “natural,”
that is, heterosexual, intercourse (Gagnon 254-57). Gagnon
contends that Paul selects homosexual conduct as “exhibit A” of
culpable gentile depravity because it “represents one of the clearest instances of conscious suppression of revelation in nature by
gentiles, inasmuch as it involves denying clear anatomical gender
differences and functions” (Gagnon 264). While Gagnon clearly
sets out the inner logic of these verses with respect to the alleged
relationship of idolatry and same-sex intercourse, he fails to recognize that this logic may derive from the original HellenisticJewish critique that Paul recites rather than from the purposes
and intentions of Paul. Additionally his entire treatment of
natural/unnatural language presupposes modern categories
rather than ancient Greco-Roman ones.3
Returning to the larger literary context (Rom. 1:18-32),
Gagnon describes Paul’s rhetorical strategy as beginning with “a
very clear example of unethical conduct and then…widening the
net until it captures all of humanity” (Gagnon 277). According
to Gagnon, Paul moves from the discussion of same-sex intercourse to a vice list (1:29-31) that is aimed mainly at Gentiles

but which blurs the boundary between Gentile and Jew, and
finally to the statement in 2:1-2 which targets the moral person,
that is, the Torah-observant Jew. The result is a “sweeping ‘sting
operation’” in which the Jew who agrees with the condemnation of Gentiles in 1:18-32 is compelled by the end of chapter 3
to acknowledge that Jews deserve judgment as well (Gagnon
278). According to Gagnon, the trap that Paul sets in 1:18-32
is for those Jews who think that they can be justified in God’s
sight through observance of the Mosaic law and apart from faith
in Christ (Gagnon 280). Since the letter is clearly addressed to
members of the church in Rome, I am not sure why Gagnon
thinks that Jews would have been Paul’s target audience.
Overall, his reading of Rom. 1:18-32 is governed by his openly
avowed agenda of proving that the Bible says that all same-sex
intercourse is sin and by a supersessionist theology that contains
a latent anti-Judaism.

An Alternative Reading of Romans 1:18-32
I begin by asking who says what to whom about what in what
circumstances for what purposes. The letter to the Romans is a
communication from the apostle Paul to the church in Rome, a
church which consists of both Judean/Jewish and non-Judean/
Gentile (specifically Greek) members (Esler 116-119). It is a
text that is addressed to Christ-followers (not Jews) of different ethnic backgrounds. It is the beliefs and behaviors of these
groups within the church that Paul seeks to alter, in particular
the ethnocentrism that each group harbors with respect to the
other.4 The effect of Paul’s argumentation from chapters 1 to 11 is
to put these two groups on the same footing. Neither Greek nor
Judean Christ-followers can portray themselves as inherently
superior to the other because both groups are equally in bondage
to sin, but in different ways (Esler 144-145).5 The only way out
of their common plight is to embrace a new in-group identity,
specifically the one arising from baptism into Christ (Esler 152).
It is within this context that Paul recites the information in
1:18-32, a passage that Gagnon describes as a typical HellenisticJewish critique of Gentiles, but which more accurately ought to be
identified as an “ethnic caricature” (Stowers 94) or an “extreme type
of stereotyping” developed by certain Judeans/Jews (Esler 147). In
this stereotype Gentiles, or perhaps more accurately the “heathen,”
(Esler 151) are portrayed as idolaters whom God has punished by
“causing or allowing their decline into unnatural sexual practices
(1:24-27) and antisocial vices (1:28-31)” (Stowers 92). The recognition
of the genre of this particular passage should immediately cause the
reader to pause. Are ethnic caricatures and stereotypes inspired by
God? Does the recitation of an ethnic stereotype by a hero of faith
in a biblical text make it a word of God? Can we in the twenty-first
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century legitimately hold up such an ethnic caricature as the basis
for developing a moral doctrine?
In light of Paul’s comments in 2:1-16, I would have to answer
unequivocally “No.” Here Paul engages in the rhetorical technique of speech-in-character creating an imaginary interlocutor
through whom Paul can criticize his audience without directly
accusing anyone of anything (Stowers 103, Witherington 76).
Paul’s first-century audience of Greek and Judean Christ-followers would “get it.” Paul’s point seems to be that “whoever
you are” (2:1), you are not in a position to judge, condemn,
caricature, or stereotype others as if you enjoy some sort of
special status. This message applies just as much to the newly
saved Greeks who might imagine themselves as superior to their
pagan neighbors as it might to the Judean Christ-followers who
grew up socialized to view all non-Judeans as inferior.6 Paul
insists that God alone can and will judge, repaying “according
to each one’s deeds” (2:6). Both ethnic groups will be judged by
the same criteria: those who do evil, both Judean and Greek,
will experience anguish and distress; while those who do good,
both Judean and Greek, will receive glory, honor, and peace
(2:9-10). The same criteria applies for the heathen: on the one
hand, they may instinctively do what the law requires; on the
other, their conflicting thoughts may accuse or excuse them
on the day of judgment (2:14-16). What Paul condemns in this
passage is precisely the kind of self-righteous presumptuous
stereotyping of which 1:18-32 is an example. The word of God
in this passage is, thus, to be found in Paul’s pronouncement
of the “law,” which in this case might be summarized as “go
and do otherwise” (Witherington 77). His proclamation of the
gospel will come later (3:21ff).
What Paul is doing in this passage, and indeed throughout
much of Romans, is engaging in what might be called a critical traditionalist revision of his audience’s beliefs and behavior.
The challenge that Paul faced was how to build or maintain a
common in-group identity (as Christ-followers) in a situation
where church members were not likely to give up their existing
subgroup (ethnic) identities. Was the church to be divided by
ethnic distinctions or united in spite of ethnic diversity? Paul’s
response was to focus on the different ways both groups were
equally enslaved to sin. Their common plight as sinners coram
Deo negates any claims of ethnic superiority. The promise that
God will justify the Judean “on the ground of faith” and the
non-Judean “through that same faith” (Rom. 3:30) unites both
groups in a new future where their ethnic identities are recognized but take second place to their shared identity in Christ
where their only obligation is to “love one another” (Rom. 13:8).
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A Lutheran Reading Romans Today
How might we use this reading in our conversations about
sexuality? We need to begin by recognizing that Rom. 1:18-32
is an ethnic stereotype. Since Paul uses this caricature as an
example of what not to do, that is, engaging in self-righteous
stereotyping, how can we use its contents as the basis for a
moral doctrine? How can any conclusion we might draw from it
about same-sex intercourse be anything but another caricature?
If Paul’s goal was to subsume (not obliterate) ethnic identities
under a new overarching identity “in Christ,” could we perhaps
find here an analogy to our situation today where the issue is
not ethnic identity but gender/sexual identity?
In this paper I believe that I have tried to articulate a
method (or at least a set of questions) that might guide an
ethically conscious reading of scripture within the Lutheran
tradition. I am calling this a “Lutheran critical traditionalist
hermeneutic.” It is distinctively Lutheran because it locates the
authority of scripture not in the literal content of the Bible,
that is, in what it says, but in what it means and in particular
how that meaning re-presents and re-embodies the life-giving
Word. Another way to say this is that scripture is the word
of God that bears in, with, and under its human and earthly
elements the Word of God. This may be the most significant
difference between my reading of Rom. 1:18-32 and that of
Robert Gagnon. He seems to operate out of an assumption
that the authority of scripture is in what it says. This leads him
to commit the common error identified by Stanley Stowers
as “The acceptance of Rom. 1:18-2:29 as an objective, inductive statement of the human condition…” an error rooted in
an uncritical assumption that Paul is “stating not only the
truth of the gospel, but also the gospel truth” (Stowers 83). So
foundational are these assumptions for Gagnon that even when
he does his exegetical homework and recognizes the genre and
rhetorical moves that Paul makes, he ignores their implications.
In doing so, he violates the intention of Paul’s argument. This is
one of the great ironies that frequently emerge from an alleged
insistence on locating the authority of scripture in what the
Bible says. The reader becomes so obsessed with a few particular
sentences or words that s/he misses the context entirely. One
suspects that in situations like this the real authority actually
lies in the reader since it is Gagnon’s agenda that controls both
the selection of the text and his reading of it. I am certainly not
claiming a “virginal perception” for my own reading. I, too,
have an agenda: advocacy for those marginalized by society.
This is why I ask “Does my reading faithfully promote the mission of Christ? Is it life-giving or death-dealing? For whom?”

Endnotes
1. Pages 27-28 lists indicators of ascribed status in America as being
male, white, able-bodied, heterosexual, Christian, and of the owning class.
2. Quotations are from Luther’s 1535 Lectures on Galatians as cited
by Lotz p. 264.
3. It is beyond the scope of this paper to go into the details, but cf.
the treatments of this subject in Martti Nissinen, Homoeroticism in
the Biblical World (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 1998) and also
in Craig Williams, Roman Homosexuality: Ideologies of Masculinity in
Classical Antiquity (New York: Oxford UP, 1999).
4. Esler pp. 40-76 provides a fine treatment of ethnicity and ethnic
conflict in the ancient Mediterranean world.
5. See also Witherington 58.
6. Later in Rom. 2:17-34 Paul will redefine genuine Judean status as
being rooted inwardly in the heart rather than in the external signs and
rites. See Esler p. 153.
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Jacqueline Bussie

Scarred Epistemologies: What a Theology of the Cross
Has to Say about the Gay Marriage Ban
I LIVE IN OHIO WHERE I teach religion and ethics. Ohio
is one of the eleven states in the 2004 election that passed
constitutional amendments effectively precluding any legal and
civil recognition or institution of gay marriage. The passage of
this state amendment dubbed colloquially as the “ban on gay
marriage” generated much local controversy within my secular
community, which has a considerable gay population, and much
national controversy within the churches, including my own
ELCA tradition. Locally and globally, the issue threatens to
divide parish against parish, synod against synod, denomination
against denomination, and perhaps most tragically as well as de
facto, neighbor against neighbor.
In a recent article, fellow Lutheran theologian Robert Benne
cites Gilbert Meilander’s claim that “One couldn’t support
the revisionist agenda on biblical or confessional grounds;
one would have to rely on social science and contemporary
experience.”  Throughout the article, Benne expresses regret
at the loss of what he terms “classical Lutheran teachings.”
He references Wolfhart Pannenberg, who similarly opposes
“attitudes [that are] oblivious to the gravity of treating the
classical tradition as optional […]” (Benne 12). In response, as a
prayerful progressive, I have begun to cast about for potential
classical resources within my own tradition to address the issue.
Is it accurate to claim that one cannot support gay marriage
using resources from within the tradition, but instead one must
uniquely use scientific and experiential resources from outside
theological tradition? How should Christians view the recent

ban on gay marriage? To answer these questions and respond to
Benne and others of like mind, I ask two questions of my own:
(1) What does a theology of the cross mean for the twentyfirst century, particularly (but not exclusively) for Lutherans
for whom it is a core concept? (2) What contributions does a
twenty-first century understanding of the theology of the cross
make to the contemporary conversation regarding gay marriage
and its ban?
It is my contention that a careful reading of Martin Luther’s
classical notion of a theologia crucis—theology of the cross—
provides us with theological support, grounded firmly in tradition and the gospel, for a convicted rejection of the ban on gay
marriage. In Christian terms, the Defense of Marriage Act(s) are
violations of agape and justice. In secular terms, the bans on gay
marriage are selective discrimination, which is unconstitutional
as a violation of the fourteenth amendment. Through meditations on three of Luther’s Heidelberg disputation theses, I glean
three corollary insights that will help prayerful Christians as
they consider where to stand on the issue. Though I seek and use
emphases within my own Lutheran tradition, I hope that my
comments here will find resonance as well as encounter beyond
denominational divides.
First, what does a theology of the cross mean to those of us
Christians living today?   The theologia crucis lies at the heart
of both Lutheran theology and the Protestant Reformation. A
theology of the cross, a term coined and developed by Martin
Luther, reconsiders the importance of the crucified, suffering
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Christ for our understanding of God, and acknowledges that
“the crucified Christ is himself a challenge to Christian theology” (Moltmann 3).  Luther felt that the Catholicism of his
day allowed the triumphalism of the resurrection to eclipse the
inscrutable shame and scandal of the cross. By emphasizing the
importance of the cross for Christian theology, Luther hoped to
correct what he considered an imbalanced, inordinate doctrinal
emphasis on the glory of the resurrection. To better understand
Luther’s project, imagine a balance, symbolizing both theology
and the Christian attitude, with both the crucifixion and resurrection on either side. Luther felt that the preaching and action
of the church (and therefore the attitudes of most Christians),
tipped the scales fully in the direction of the resurrection. In
the glory of Easter Sunday, in other words, the tragedy of Good
Friday was lost.
Luther’s theology of the cross applies a corrective to this
imbalance. Because the modern reader easily forgets the original
historical context, however, the name tends to mislead. The
theology of the cross has often been misinterpreted, for example,
to mean that Christians should neglect or forget the resurrection and focus exclusively on the crucifixion. As Luther himself
would say, by no means! Such a misinterpretation led and still
leads to the resurrection-blind results of despair, fatalism, cynicism, theological paralysis, and ethical quietism. Such readings
have particularly upset feminists, who interpret Luther to be
placing an inordinate emphasis upon redemptive suffering and
a subsequent Christian need to accept illegitimate suffering and
oppression. While I value these critiques, nonetheless Luther’s
theological telos was to create a balance between these two crucial christological ideas, not simply to recreate an imbalance in
the other direction.
Instead Luther, in my interpretation, urges Christians
to leave behind such human either/or thinking and testify
to a divine, scriptural “both-and” mode of understanding
the gospel. The gospel scriptures assert that Christ was both
crucified and resurrected; neither is to be understood without
the other. We need to understand both ideas dialectically, an
approach that is, incidentally, consistent with much of feminist theory. Christians, therefore, must look at the world with
a dual consciousness, holding the paradoxical “both-and” of
crucifixion and resurrection before their hearts and minds as
they theologize, interpret, and act in the world. For Luther, the
Christian view is bifocal. In Luther’s epistemology, we are to
understand God in both the scandal of the cross and the glory
of the resurrection. However, the resurrection does not negate
the cross’s scandal, nor does the cross negate the resurrection’s
beauty. To the world (and often even to the church) this paradox
has proved a difficult burden to bear, yet God calls us to do so.

Thus, Luther’s theology of the cross should be understood as
a methodology, not as a doctrine or dogma. It is a posture of
faithfulness before both God and world.
The theology of the cross does indeed help us conceive a
response to one of the most important social issues of our day,
gay marriage. Specifically, a theology of the cross provides three
important insights, prompted by three of Luther’s remarks,
which help us in our struggle to discern the will of God in such
a difficult and divisive issue.

Meditation 1: “A theology of glory calls evil good
and good evil. A theology of the cross calls the thing
what it actually is.”
—Martin Luther, Heidelberg Disputation 53
First, a theology of the cross reveals a relevant cautionary
reminder that human beings, particularly in the collective,
possess an ugly and dangerous proclivity toward scapegoating.
Human beings tend to call things by the wrong names. By nailing Jesus to the cross, human beings, caught up in their glorious preconceived notion of the messiah as a triumphant hero,
effectively label Christ as evil, as a blasphemer and a rebel. Surely
the real messiah would have triumphed over his enemies and not
allowed himself to be mocked! Thinking thus, the people executed Jesus, calling him a criminal. The theologian of the cross
must testify to this truth, but also simultaneously to the truth
of the resurrection. The resurrection revealed that Jesus was the
son of God, sinless and pure, the quintessence of goodness. Yet
human beings, without exception (except for a pagan!), mistakenly called Jesus “evil.” Rather than humiliating human persons
with this knowledge, God in an act of radical grace freely chose
to allow all human beings to acquire Jesus’s “alien righteousness”
as their own, “The love of God does not find, but creates, that
which is pleasing to it” (Luther 41). While the crucifixion reveals
human sinfulness, the resurrection reveals God’s gracefulness. A
theology of the cross reminds us that instead of acknowledging
our own guilt and blame, we human beings tend to deflect our
own guilt on to someone else, someone who is innocent of the
particular crime with which they are charged.
No doubt many might ask, what can this rhetoric possibly
have to do with homosexuals? Homosexuals are sinful, and
therefore must in no way be compared to our sinless Lord Jesus
Christ! To which I respond yes, homosexuals are sinful, as are
all human beings, gay or straight. Calling things by their right
names, a theology of the cross reveals that no one is guiltless
and proclaims with the apostle Paul, “For all have sinned and
fall short of the glory of God” (Rom. 3:23). While Christ alone
was innocent of all charges of sin, human beings are all guilty of
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some sin or another in the eyes of God. However, not all human
beings are guilty of the particular crime with which they are
charged. For example, Jews during the Nazi regime were charged
with being “enemies of the state,” in spite of the fact that Jews
in no way posed a threat to the state and were indeed less than
2% of the population. The Holocaust is indeed one of the prime
historical examples of our horrifying tendency toward unjustified scapegoating. Christians and their antisemitism played an
enormous role in this scapegoating. Christians persecuted Jews
for centuries in Europe because of their reading of scripture:
Jews were Christ-killers, plain and simple. In the wake of the
Holocaust, the Lutheran church took responsibility for the
church and Luther’s antisemitism and issued a formal apology
to our Jewish brothers and sisters. The Roman Catholic Church
also issued a formal apology in Vatican II. The urgent question facing us today is: fifty years from now, will the church be
ashamed of its current position toward homosexuality and gay
marriage, as we have been ashamed before?
Notably, the Third Reich also charged homosexuals with
being enemies of the state as they were an assault on the foundation of German society, the family. Over 100,000 homosexuals were persecuted, tortured, and/or murdered during the
Holocaust. Does knowledge of historical discrimination against
homosexuals make a difference in our minds about contemporary laws concerning homosexuals? Sadly, less than 25% of
Americans today are aware of the fact that homosexuals were
even victims in any way of the Nazis. If they had known, would
it have made a difference at the polls on election day? A definitive answer to this question is not possible, though it should
highlight for thoughtful Christians the dreadful potential for
condemnation (labeling a group as “evil”) to lead to active persecution. As is well known in the cases of people like Matthew
Shepherd, homosexuals in our own country are often the
victims of persecution, violence, and hate crimes. In the current
American political arena, homosexuals are “charged” with “corrupting or destroying the sanctity of marriage.” According to
this logic, laws are needed to protect marriage. Hence in Ohio,
our state legislature passed a law called the Defense of Marriage
Act, an act whose very name implies that marriage needs to be
defended from those who would otherwise destroy it without
our preventive measures. The assumption is, of course, that marriage needs to be defended against homosexuals; hence “Issue
1” on the Ohio ballot was referred to by every form of media as
“the ban on gay marriage.” Are gays and lesbians indeed guilty
as charged?
Here, the theology of the cross as methodology begs me to
ask the question, could this accusation against homosexuals be
yet another manifestation of the Christian complicity in and
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human tendency toward unjustified scapegoating? Could this
condemnation of homosexuals as the source of the corruption of
marriage be a classic case of the egregiously mistaken human tendency to call the good evil and the evil good, at least in part? Both
at the level of intentionality and action, I cannot find any empirical
evidence that gay marriage destroys the sanctity of marriage.
And what of scriptural evidence? Though an in-depth biblical study is beyond the scope of this essay, in all seven references
to what contemporary readers term homosexuality, the Bible
speaks only of same-sex acts, never of sexual orientation let alone
gay marriage, a possibility never entertained by the biblical writers. The Bible does speak negatively of same-sex acts, referring
to them as unnatural. Is it then the unnaturalness of certain
sex-acts that corrupts marriage? What constitutes an unnatural
sex-act? Anal sex? What of oral sex? Do American Christians
consider these acts are unnatural? Is it then that particular sexacts corrupt marriage? But what of the gay couples who perform
none of these “unnatural” sex-acts (and yes, there are plenty of
people who fall into this category)? Aren’t heterosexual couples
who engage in “unnatural” sex-acts like oral sex destroying the
sanctity of marriage? If so, countless people, including innumerable Christians, stand indicted. Where are the additional laws
needed to protect marriage from these sorts of attacks from
within? Why can heterosexuals engage in all these “corruptions” of marriage and more, with impunity? Are heterosexual
marriages permitted because they are sinless, and homosexual
marriages prohibited because they are sinful? What straight
Christian could claim before God that their marriage is sinless?
Do heterosexuals bear no blame at all for the crumbling of
marriage in America? I fear that the scapegoating of homosexuals for marriage’s corruption can lead American heterosexual
Christians down this path of no accountability, to a theology
of righteousness which bears no resemblance to a theology of
the cross. Jesus, after all, in the book of Matthew, suggests that
divorce —not homosexuality, which Jesus never condemns—is
an assault on the sanctity of marriage. Mark 10:11: “He
answered, ‘Anyone who divorces his wife and marries another
woman commits adultery against her. And if she divorces her
husband and marries another man, she commits adultery.’”
Jesus could not have been more correct in labeling that which
indisputably corrupts the sanctity of marriage: marriage’s
dissolution. Sanctity means holy or sacred, religiously binding,
and inviolable. Christian divorce violates the inviolable, tearing apart with human hands and deeds what God has bound
together. Jesus’s assertion has the added flourish of being both
rationally and empirically verifiable—surely the tragic death of
every marriage is an assault on marriage’s supposed inviolability and sanctity.

As a heterosexual theologian of the cross, I feel compelled to
call things by their right names. To use Luther’s terms of good
and evil, divorce is evil, if by evil we mean that which destroys
marriage. The legalization of divorce in this country goes directly
against the very words uttered by the lips of our Lord. However,
most churches, innumerable Christians, and the American legal
system have determined (I think understandably) that divorce
is, at times, a necessary evil, a last resort. Yet where is the moral
outrage over such legalization? Divorce is for many, a regrettable
exception to the norm. For many thoughtful Christians, divorce is
an exception grounded in the reality and inescapability of human
sinfulness. For still others, however, divorce is simply a no-fault
agreement. Some heterosexuals marry three, four, even five times
in a lifetime, in clear violation of the Ohio state constitutional
amendment that states, “Only a union between one man and one
woman may be a marriage valid in or recognized by this state and
its political subdivisions.” In practice, the state clearly recognizes
not one, but multiple successive marriages for heterosexuals as
valid. Why aren’t Christians concerned about the fact that there
is absolutely no limit on the serial monogamy of heterosexuals,
who could feasibly be married and remarried twenty times in one
lifetime, while living in one state? The “gay marriage ban” isolates
homosexuals as the only persons who are both unmarriageable
and corruptors of marriage’s sanctity.
Divorce, however, fortunately can and never will be
prescriptive for Christians. We do not wish for all to be
divorced. Similarly, gay marriage can never be prescriptive,
in the sense that prayerful progressives do not wish for all
marriages to be gay unions. Many prayerful progressives
are not arguing for homosexuality to become universal
behavior—any more than they are pushing for divorce to
be universal. Prayerful progressives’ arguments must not
be summarized with this straw-man fallacy. No, prayerful
progressives like myself are pointing to a double standard
that may very well rely on a theology of glory—the naïve
triumphalism of heterosexual Christians that they have
successfully sustained the sanctity of marriage, despite all
evidence to the contrary. Prayerful theologians of the cross
might ask the question, can the Christian church conceive
of homosexuality as a legal exception to the Christian norm,
just like divorce? That is, acceptable and even celebrated
by some who consider it sinless, regrettable to others who
consider it sinful but acceptable as a necessary evil because
of the omnipresence of human sinfulness—but however you
slice it, perfectly legal? No good reason why this compromise is not possible, particularly from the standpoint of
justice, has been presented. As things currently stand, many
might appositely accuse Christians of inconsistency, pushing

as they have for laws ostensibly honoring one part of the
biblical text (homosexuality) while completely conceding to
secular values on the other (divorce). The prayerful progressive position advocates with consistency for acceptance of
both exceptions.

Meditation 2: “Although the works of man always
seem attractive and good, they are nevertheless likely to
be mortal sins….Without the theology of the cross, men
misuse the best in the worst manner.”
—Martin Luther, Heidelberg Disputation 43,55
The second insight the theology of the cross grants to the
Christian struggling to take a stand on the issue of gay marriage
is the notion that our epistemologies are deeply wounded. At our
very best, without exception, an authentic consideration of the
crucifixion demands that we recognize that we employ scarred
epistemologies. What does this mean? To answer, we must also
discuss the theological anthropology suggested by a theology of
the cross. In effect we must answer two questions here: Who are
human beings, and how does this affect what we know?
According to Luther, Christians are embodied paradoxes.
That is to say, looking at the world through the bifocal lens of
the crucifixion and resurrection shows us that human beings
are simul justus et peccator. This Latin phrase means that all
Christians who truly understand the gospel and the theology of
the cross understand themselves in a strange manner—that is, as
persons who are simultaneously righteous and sinful. Christians
are justified sinners, righteous sinners, rendered righteous not
by a single word or deed of their own but instead only through
the righteousness of Christ. “It is the sweetest righteousness
of God the Father that he does not save imaginary, but rather,
real sinners, sustaining us in spite of our sins and accepting our
works and our lives which are all deserving of rejection, until he
perfects and saves us […] we […] escape his judgment through his
mercy, not through our righteousness” (Luther 63).
Luther urges us to understand that human beings’ existence
as simul justus et peccator dramatically affects both our knowledge and our actions. This calls for a radical reversal in human
thinking, which typically feels more comfortable in a theology
of glory, because it permits the fanciful notion that some individuals stand on a pure and moral high ground. Instead, Luther’s
theology of the cross suggests that neither can be without
ambiguity. To make this point abundantly clear, Luther quotes
Eccles. 7:20, “Surely there is not a righteous man on earth who
does good and never sins,” and Ps. 143:2, “No man living is righteous before thee.” No thought, understanding, belief, action,
or institution is ever untainted by human sin. Sin permeates all,
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even Christians, churches, marriage, and biblical interpretations. Thus in Moltmann’s terms, for Luther, Christ “is a scandal
even for Christian theology” (Moltmann 3).
In the realm of epistemology, sin’s ubiquity suggests that no
human being can claim full knowledge of God’s will. A theology
of the cross simultaneously testifies to our deep intimacy and
connectedness with God but also to our radical disconnection and
alienation from God. It is not one or the other, but always both.
Practically, this means whether I am a progressive or a conservative, indeed whatever my position, a theology of the cross necessitates that I adopt a position of self-critique. Luther reminds us,
“Arrogance cannot be avoided or true hope be present unless the
judgment of condemnation is feared in every work” (Luther 48).
In shorthand, a theology of the cross urges us to ask about even
our noblest enterprises such as ethical decision-making: Could I
be wrong? No one can corner the market on God’s will and truth.
A theology of the cross introduces the scary truth of fallibility,
stated scripturally in Romans as “all have sinned and fall short of
the glory of God” (Rom. 3:23). On this issue, scripture is surprisingly unambiguous, “For God has imprisoned all in disobedience
so that he may be merciful to all” (Rom. 11:32).
No doubt many of my fellow Christians will counter that
the will of God is clear and unambiguous and is preserved in
the word of God. If the Bible were without ambiguity, however,
Christians would not be plagued with these discussions. As
only one case in point, while the Bible says thou shalt not kill,
it also admonishes the chosen people of God to slaughter the
Canaanites without mercy in warfare. Such is the basis of our
current debates on war. Similarly, though some biblical passages
condemn same-sex acts, particularly in the Old Testament, other
biblical passages seem potentially to trump this injunction-for example, Gal. 3:28: “There is neither Jew nor Greek, slave
nor free, male nor female, for you are all one in Christ Jesus,”
to which we could conceivably add “gay and straight.” In the
midst of this ambiguity, a theology of the cross reminds us of
the difficult truth that even biblical interpretation, tainted as it
is by human sin like every other human endeavor, is and can be
guided by human agendas rather than divine ones.
Vast historical evidence corroborates this insight. Christian
pastors and parishioners, for example, used their skewed reading
of the Christian Bible as their primary source for supporting
slavery. The Bible appears to support slavery, yet no American
Christian supports this interpretation today. We consistently
reinterpret the Bible in light of our culture, but many act as if we
are just doing this for the first time in the case of homosexuality. A more recent and perhaps relevant example occurred in
1998 in South Carolina, where state legislators realized that a
law banning interracial marriage was still on the books. At that
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time, a Christian senator stood up on the senate floor and stated
that based on his Christian beliefs and the Bible, he believed
interracial marriages were an abomination to God and man.
Our laws obviously once shared this senator’s viewpoint that
miscegenation was a corruption of marriage’s sanctity. However,
since 1967, state interracial marriage bans have been declared
unconstitutional under the fourteenth amendment. (This raises
the question: why does race qualify under the equal protection clause but not sexuality?) A majority of Christians once
shared this senator’s views as well, though now they no longer
do. Clearly these former “Christian” positions were guided by
human agendas and not divine ones, but very few people realized this at the time. A theology of the cross, however, reminds
us all that such interpretations are likely. Could the same human
agendas of prejudice be at stake in the gay marriage debate over
reinterpretation of scripture? Given my understanding of our
scarred epistemologies, I cannot and do not claim absolute truth
for my position. Instead, I respectfully offer it up to thoughtful
Christians, especially within the ELCA, for their consideration
as a countervoice to the mainstream.
A theology of the cross therefore reminds of our beautiful
need of one another, what I term our dialogical need of the other.
A theology of the cross suggests that human beings need one
another, to call one another up short and help us to discern the
log in our own eye to which we are blind, busy as we are finding
the sty in everyone else’s. In our blindness, only God, working
through our neighbors and their agape, can help. The point of
such difficult discussions is not to claim that nothing can be
said, but for Christians to enter into dialogue about their interpretations, serving as necessary critics of one another with those
on the opposite side of the spectrum.
Sin, therefore, is a great equalizer. But perhaps you are asking,
are Christians then completely unable to make absolute truth
claims, left with nothing but relativism? A theology of the cross
suggests that we can and must still speak, yet we must confess
that our claims are provisional. Undoubtedly this thought
makes many people uncomfortable, and they would see such a
claim as a curse and a sell-out. I can only remind these dialogue
partners that on Good Friday, we condemned Christ as a criminal and blasphemer. Even his own disciples betrayed, denied,
and abandoned him. Thankfully, however, we have a forgiving
God. On the basis of grace, God overturned our judgment of
Christ and instead passed his own. God’s judgment, importantly, did not resemble our own in the slightest, but instead was
its opposite. A theology of the cross reminds me that only God
judges (crucifixion) and only God saves and redeems (resurrection). Nothing that human beings do or say or even believe earns
them salvation—only a theology of glory would believe such a

thing. Says Luther, “The person who believes that he can obtain
grace by doing what is in him adds sin to sin so that he becomes
doubly guilty” (Luther 50).
The concept of being saved by grace lies at the core of
Lutheran teaching, and with Luther, I believe it is a relief that I
am not saved by my own merit or my own judgments. I therefore
interpret the provisionality of human truth claims to be a blessing, and not a curse. Such knowledge of provisionality leaves
room for the Holy Spirit to work in the world and for God to be
alive and sovereign, working through and in human beings to
provide human life with future revelation of Godself. The provisionality of human truth claims, even moral and theological
ones, leaves room for the resurrection to happen. If human labels
and judgments were definitive, there would be no Resurrection,
and no resurrections. In the face of God, I cannot claim absolute
knowledge. I can only speak and act as the Spirit guides me, and
as a theologian of the cross that means with deep humility and
consciousness of my own fallibility.
Even though we will undoubtedly err in our biblical interpretations and subsequent social ethics, my principle of selectivity
is the scriptural Christ-given principle of
agape found in Mark 12:31: “‘Love your
neighbor as yourself.’ There is no commandment greater than these.”  When
faced with ambiguity as in the situation of homosexuality, I
choose as a theologian of the cross to err on the side of agape,
understanding that if God’s judgment one day proves me wrong
(crucifixion,) we also have a loving and forgiving God (resurrection.) As contemporary Christians, we must confess our
principles of selectivity as well as our selective literalism. After
all, how many of us stone children to death when they curse
their parents, as Exod. 21:17 commands? How many of us do
as Christ instructed in Mark 10:21 and sell all that we have and
give it to the poor?
Wherever selective literalism is unconfessed and unacknowledged, as it commonly is in contemporary discussions of gay
marriage, a theology of the cross cautions that a human prejudicial agenda could be at work. A theology of the cross implies
that God’s justice compels me to also act for justice in the world.
From the standpoint of justice toward homosexuals, I must ask,
on what possible biblical basis can we ban exclusively homosexuals from the civil institution of marriage? As things currently
stand, they are the only consenting adults not permitted to
marry by law. But scripturally, are those who commit same-sex
acts the only “sinners”? Surely not! What of murderers? Can
they marry? The answer is yes, in every state, even if they are
behind bars.1 What of other biblical sinners of a more sexual
nature, such as adulterers, can they marry? Can rapists marry?

Can child molesters and abusers get married, and therefore have
children? Can persons convicted of domestic violence against a
spouse marry? Clearly adulterers, rapists, child molesters, and
spousal-abusers undeniably violate the sanctity of marriage;
what sane person would argue otherwise? But can all of these
persons (criminals, actually) legally marry? Yes, yes, yes, and
yes. As long as one is heterosexual in America and a consenting
adult, marriage is yours for the taking, and abusing.
As a theologian of the cross who calls things by their right
names, when I look at the current legislation banning same-sex
marriage, I can think only of Martin Luther King Jr.’s definition of an unjust law. In the Letter from Birmingham Jail,
King defines an unjust law as “a code that a numerical or power
majority group compels a minority group to obey but does not
make binding on itself. This is difference made legal” (King
430). Letter for letter, the current gay marriage ban qualifies as
an unjust law according to Dr. King. My conscience therefore
condemns the gay-marriage ban with my very being, as there is
no denying that it is a law passed by a power majority group on
a minority group which is not binding for itself. Far be it from

A theology of the cross implies that God’s justice
compels me to also act for justice in the world.
us as Christians to support injustice, analogous to the way many
Americans Christians were blind to the injustice of race relations for decades. As an American citizen, I can only think of
our legal system, which deems unconstitutional any and all laws
that target only one specific group and deny them equal rights.
Both a theology of the cross and the Constitution condemn acts
of discrimination. Martin Luther and his namesake Dr. King
stand united on this issue. Justice is the concern of theology and
of Christians just as surely as it is the concern of every American
citizen. I ask myself, how could such a violation of justice have
passed, primarily with the support of Christians who claim to
seek justice?2
The gay marriage ban therefore does just what it purports
to do: exclusively targets homosexuals and stigmatizes them as
unworthy of marriage. In supporting such a ban, the Christian
churches participate in injustice, albeit perhaps unwittingly
and in the very name of justice—but the theology of the cross
forewarns us of such irony. By supporting this ban, the churches
tacitly ignore other marital issues in which one person would
concede that they are hurt by the other—spousal abuse and rape,
child molestation, and adultery. (Notably, in gay unions, both
parties claim not only to not be hurt, but to flourish.) What
kind of message do we send to our young people by isolating our
marital laws and our support of such laws to homosexuality? We
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send the message that as the body of Christ, we do not condemn
rape, adultery, domestic violence, murder and child abuse as
corruptions of marriage. Only being gay matters; only homosexuality corrupts marital covenants. Have we unreasonably
isolated a “sin” that is easy to categorize as “other”—the “sin”
of being gay—in order to protect ourselves and our presumed
righteousness? Are we afraid to condemn behaviors that are
not conveniently isolatable to a group to which most of us do
not belong? After all, homosexuality is not a behavior which
tempts heterosexuals; behaviors such as anger, mistreatment of
our spouse and adultery, on the other hand, are real temptations
for all of us. If we condemn these too loudly, are we afraid of
condemning ourselves? A theologian of the cross must wonder
here if a theology of glory is at work. When will we at last call
things by their right names?

Meditation 3: “That person does not deserve to be
called a theologian who looks upon the invisible things
of God as though they were clearly perceptible in those
things which have actually happened.”  
—Martin Luther, Heidelberg Disputation 52
The third and final insight offered by a theology of the cross
regards God. Because God cannot be fully known by us, this section is of necessity the shortest of my three sections, yet perhaps
most noteworthy. We human beings ask, who is God? And a theology of the cross answers: God is Immanuel, that is, God with us.
For Luther, the strangeness of the gospel tale lies primarily in the
fact that God was present in such a humiliating place such as the
cross. He writes, “Now it is not sufficient for anyone, and it does
him no good to recognize God in his glory and majesty, unless he
recognizes him in the humility and shame of the cross. Thus God
destroys the wisdom of the wise, as Isaiah 45:15 says, ‘Truly, thou
art a God who hidest thyself’” (Luther 52-53).
The incarnation and crucifixion imply, therefore, that God
can be found anywhere—absolutely anywhere. This insight,
Luther well recognized, is simultaneously scandalous and beautiful. On the one hand, it means that no place is so remote that
God is not present. In suffering, death, grief, radical doubt, and
even murder, God—Immanuel—is there. On the other hand,
this insight means that human beings cannot discern, let alone
limit where God’s grace is at work and where it is not. Indeed, a
theology of the cross states that the work of God’s grace is invisible to the human eye and therefore can be seen only with the
eyes of faith which hopes in things unseen.
A theology of the cross also reveals that God judges and condemns (crucifixion) and saves and redeems (resurrection.) God is
both judge and redeemer; human beings are ultimately neither for
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they tend to misjudge and have no power to redeem. All human
institutions and endeavors thus stand under both God’s judgment
and God’s redemption. Because we cannot think the resurrection
without the cross, however, we are reminded that the redemption
of the world is proleptic and paradoxical. That is, it is already but
not yet. Until the eschaton, God uses the raw materials of this
world, including human beings, as vehicles of his grace and justice.
Who is responsible for sanctifying a marriage? According
to Luther and a theology of the cross, God alone sanctifies
marriage. Human beings and their actions cannot sanctify or
bless their own marriages. This gives new meaning to Matt.
19:6, “What therefore God has joined together, let no man put
asunder.” A theology of the cross insists that human beings
cannot domesticate God and limit God’s sovereignty or workings of grace in any way. Marriage, in the sacramental view
of most churches, can function as a vehicle of God’s grace to
human beings, should God choose to bless the marriage in this
way. That being said, do heterosexual Christians dare to have the
audacity to claim that God cannot and will not ever choose to
use gay marriage and love to extend his grace to human beings?
Who are we to limit God in such a way? Who are we to limit the
possibility of grace in advance for other human beings through
our laws? Can we say that God cannot join together homosexuals? A theology of the cross cautions against such human
domestication of God’s sovereignty, particularly because human
beings, given the choice, would certainly have denied that God
could use the scandal of a criminal’s execution on the cross to
work his grace on the entire world. God’s logic is not our logic. A
theology of the cross reveals that considering the two conflatable is pure folly. In the words of C.S. Lewis, God is the great
iconoclast. This must not be forgotten.
In conclusion, my essay disproves the claim that one has to rely
exclusively on social science and contemporary experience and
not the Lutheran tradition in order to argue for the acceptance
of gay marriage. Using the theology of the cross, an idea that lies
at the heart of the Lutheran tradition, I have shown an alternative interpretation of the issue. Before God, I assert my theology
and resulting social ethic with great fear and trembling, in the
knowledge that my epistemology is scarred. Before God, I cannot
claim to know if my own position is sinful or just, though like
all human endeavors according to a theology of the cross, it is
probably an admixture of both. If my dialogue partners cannot
confess the same of their own positions, have they truly heard
the message of the cross? Before human beings, I must confess
that my conscience convinces me that anti-homosexualism is the
last acceptable prejudice in this country. That homosexuals are
humiliated on a daily basis and stigmatized as being the only segment of our society unworthy of the blessings of marriage, of this

there is no doubt. While some would argue that this humiliation
is well deserved and brought on by choice and by guilt, I cannot
avoid considering the alternative possibility that this humiliation
is brought on by scapegoating and unconfessed human agendas
of political self-interest and spiritual self-righteousness. In this
regard I ask to be heard, and invite responses. I close by encouraging my fellow Christians, whatever their views, to remember that
the authentic desire to discern God’s will for the people of God
provides a common ground all Christians, be they “prayerful progressives” or “compassionate conservatives.” Where this insight is
lost, no authentic dialogue is possible.

Endnotes
1. Notably, the U.S. Supreme Court in Turner vs Safley ruled in
1987 that prisoners were allowed to get married, citing marriage as a
fundamental civil right (Turner).
2. No doubt at this point many protest that under this reasoning,
polygamy, too, should be permitted. For surely the defense of marriage
acts also discriminate against those minority groups who seek polygamy. To this rebuttal, I have two brief responses. First, I can only point
out that those who seek polygamy have a strong scriptural basis for
their actions—i.e. models of the faith such as Abraham had multiple
wives. This of course only proves my point that everyone, whether they
confess it or not, consistently interpret the Bible selectively according
to their own community and standards. Second, however, polygamy is
to be rejected by Christians because it is inherently discriminatory and
a violation of justice. Polygamy, it should be noted, also qualifies for an
unjust law using Dr. King’s definition. Those who seek polygamy mean
by the term both in concept and in praxis the practice of having multiple wives. At no time do they mean the practice of having multiple
husbands (for which there is no scriptural precedent.) While many
men would love to have multiple wives, how many of those same men
would be willing to share their wife with countless other men? Men
who seek polygamy have no intention of sharing such privileges with
women. Again I can only quote the Christian minister Dr. King, this is
difference made legal.
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Robert Benne

What Could the Lutheran Colleges and Universities
Contribute to the ELCA Discussion of Sexuality—
But What Would They Actually Contribute?
The churchwide assembly of the ELCA took on
some tough sexuality issues during its August 2005 meeting
in Orland, Florida. It voted to continue under the guidance
of the 1993 Bishop’s Statement that there were no grounds in
scripture or tradition for blessing gay or lesbian unions, but at
the same time it refused to provide for the discipline of those
who ignored that guidance. A narrow majority voted down
the provision for the ordination of partnered gays and lesbians
through an exceptional process. However, such a provision
would have required a two-thirds majority since it would have
meant constitutional changes.
The preassembly Sexuality Task Force and Church Council
ducked the normative question that has to be answered by the
newly constituted Task Force: are there adequate biblical and
theological grounds for lifting the age-old and near-universal
Christian proscription of homosexual conduct, even if it occurs
in committed same-sex pairs? The clear answer to that question
may lead to a church split, especially if the ELCA answers the
question affirmatively.
The question before us is this: Would the active involvement
of college and university faculties in this possibly church-dividing conflict be helpful? What I would hope for in answering
that question is far different from what I think would happen.
What I would hope for goes something like this: I would
hope for a balanced mixture of what James Davison Hunter

calls the “orthodox” and “progressive” perspectives among the
faculty of the religion and social science departments on the
issues being dealt with by the ELCA. (By “progressive” Hunter
means those who believe we ought to revise or reject central
tenets of received moral tradition according to the enlightened
opinion of the day, informed as it is by contemporary experience and practice. On the other hand, the “orthodox” believe
that these central tenets are settled moral truths that have been
revealed in the tradition and therefore cannot be compromised
by even the most enlightened opinion of the day.) Between
those poles would be a segment of the faculty who would
occupy a middle ground on these contested sexuality issues.
Given this sort of balance, the Lutheran colleges could actually model fair discourse on something as volatile as the subject
of homosexuality. Theological ethicists from both sides would
be invited to make their best arguments, realizing that a moral
tradition of two thousand year duration and of near universal
acceptance among the major Christian churches would need
overwhelming arguments and evidence against it to call it into
serious question. In other words, traditional moral teaching would
be given the benefit of the doubt and treated with high respect.
The social sciences would evenhandedly marshal the huge
amount of new research on marriage, divorce, gay and lesbian
unions, cohabitation, sexual abuse, and family life. Where our
culture is heading on these issues would be presented from

Robert Benne is the Director of the Center for Religion and Society at Roanoke College and Professor and Chair in the Department of
Religion and Philosophy.
34 | Intersections | Spring 2006

various ideological perspectives, but there would be a search for
reliable empirical material that all sides would consider accurate.
The many other disciplines could enter the conversation from
their perspectives. And, of course, students would be invited to
listen in and participate in appropriate ways.
Perhaps the conversation would not—and maybe should
not—lead to a definitive conclusion. But such fair moral discourse could be funneled into the larger church discussion in
the many ways already provided by the ELCA. Perhaps colleges
could publish articles and books on these issues similar to what
the seminaries did.
That is my idyllic expectation of how a Lutheran college
faculty might carry on fair moral discourse. But such a marvelous thing is not likely to happen because the preponderance of
“progressives” in the academy is so large that real moral discourse
would be nearly impossible. That majority, reflecting American
elite opinion in general, is so hefty that its opinions have often
taken on the characteristics of unchallengeable truths. These
“truths” are so deeply assumed by the majority that they no
longer need to be argued; any intelligent person of good will
would hold them. Those who depart from that alleged consensus
are then considered to be neither intelligent nor goodwilled.
Indeed, the “dissenters” are then often met with derision while
those of the majority opinion are cheered on, sometimes literally
so. Such an atmosphere tends to intimidate minority opinion
and squelch debate.
I have much anecdotal evidence for the truth of such an
analysis since I have been often in the minority in the academy
and elite levels of the church on sexuality issues, as well as on
political and other cultural issues. However, it is easy to move to
other contexts where the deep-running assumptions are just the
opposite. Neither situation makes for good debate. The academy,
however, is definitely in the hands of the “progressives.”
The famous research by Klein, Stern, and Western1 indicates
a ratio of more than ten to one in favor of liberals over conservatives in six nationwide social science and humanities associations. Political and cultural liberalism are not exactly correlated
but there are some pretty strong convergences. Earlier studies
done on Lutheran colleges suggest that they are more liberal
than other private colleges. My hunch is that few Lutheran
colleges would have a healthy balance between “orthodox” and
“progressive” faculty on these hot-button sexuality issues. The
imbalance would be sufficient to make debate very difficult.
The great majority would wade in on the “progressive” side and
merely reinforce the already progressive views of the seminaries
and the national level of the ELCA.
Of course, if you believe that the “progressives” have the right
“take” on this matter you might cheer this kind of contribution

on the part of the colleges and universities. But such a one-sided
contribution would not help the ELCA come to a careful judgment that both respects the Great Tradition and the challenges
presented by the modern world.
But hold on. It would be possible to gather a fair balance of
perspectives from across the colleges and universities that could
indeed enrich this weighty debate. However, it would take
the wisdom of Solomon and the courage of St. Paul to do the
selection and the gathering. Thus far the ELCA has not been
able to gather the proper balance for such fair moral discourse.
Maybe the colleges and universities could actually pull off such
a gathering. But who would do the selecting, the gathering, and
the hosting?

End Note
1. For a summary of the findings see “National Survey Finds
Academe Politically Imbalanced.” NAS Update 14.2 (2005): 9. The
fuller study is published as Daniel B. Klein, Charlotta Stern, and
Andrew Western, “Documenting the One-Party Campus,” Academic
Questions Winter (2004-2005): 40-52.
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ELCA College & Universities

Augsburg College | minneapolis, minnesota
Augustana College | rock island, illinois
Augustana College | sioux falls, south dakota
Bethany College | lindsborg, kansas
California Lutheran University | thousand oaks, california
Capital University | columbus, ohio
Carthage College | kenosha, wisconsin
Concordia College | moorhead, minnesota
Dana College | blair, nebraska
Finlandia University | hancock, michigan
Gettysburg College | gettysburg, pennsylvania
Grand View College | des moines, iowa
Gustavus Adolphus College | st. peter, minnesota
Lenoir-Rhyne College | hickory, north carolina
Luther College | decorah, iowa
Midland Lutheran College | fremont, nebraska
Muhlenberg College | allentown, pennsylvania
Newberry College | newberry, south carolina
Pacific Lutheran University | tacoma, washington
Roanoke College | salem, virginia
St. Olaf College | northfield, minnesota
Susquehanna University | selinsgrove, pennsylvania
Texas Lutheran University | seguin, texas
Thiel College | greenville, pennsylvania
Wagner College | staten island, new york
Wartburg College | waverly, iowa
Wittenberg University | springfield, ohio
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